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POLITICAL JUSTICE AND TAX POLICY: THE
SOCIAL WELFARE ORGANIZATION CASE
by: Philip Hackney*
ABSTRACT
In addition to valuing whether a tax policy is equitable, efficient, and administrable, I argue we should ask if a tax policy is politically just. Others
have made a similar case for valuing political justice as democracy in implementing just tax policy. I join that call and highlight why it matters in one
arena—tax exemption. I also further that discussion by arguing that politically
just tax policy does the least harm to the democratic functioning of our government and may ideally enhance it. I argue that our right to an equal voice in
collective decision-making is the most fundamental value of political justice.
To test this case, I evaluate our choice to exempt “social welfare organizations” from the U.S. income tax. In addition to efficiency and equity, I also
ask whether the policy is politically just in a democratic sense. I examine three
models of democratic justice: liberal, republican, and deliberative. In making
the democratic case, I try to find commonalities among the three in order to
further what an agreed upon notion of democratic justice might look like in
the tax context. I contend that the notion of democratic justice must exist at the
substantive level of the Internal Revenue Code (“Code”). This Code-level application demonstrates that the typical criteria of efficiency and fairness do not
provide sufficient criteria to evaluate the justice of tax-exempt policy. Political
justice provides additional important evaluative criteria. There are likely significant other parts of income tax policy that need to be considered from the
value of political justice as democracy as well.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Much tax policy scholarship adopts the maximization of a social
welfare function as its guidepost1 or attempts to show whether tax policy is unfair economically to some classes of people.2 Tax policy schol1. See, e.g., David A. Weisbach & Joseph Bankman, The Superiority of an Ideal
Consumption Tax Over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1413 (2006) (arguing
in effect that economically an ideal consumption tax will generate greater social welfare than an ideal income tax); LOUIS KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND
PUBLIC ECONOMICS xvii (2008) (stating that the social objective of the normative
study of taxation is “taken here to be the maximization of a conventional social welfare function . . . .”). But cf. Eric M. Zolt, The Uneasy Case for Uniform Taxation, 16
VA. TAX REV. 39, 62 (1996) [hereinafter Uniform Taxation] (arguing generally for the
maximization of a social welfare function, but acknowledging “[a] society may choose
an inefficient allocation of resources based on concerns of equity or justice or other
criteria”).
2. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Three Goals of Taxation, 60 TAX L. REV.
1 (2006) (adopting both the maximization or social welfare and economic unfairness
arguments, but also arguing that tax is used to regulate); C. Eugene Steuerle, And
Equal (Tax) Justice For All?, in TAX JUSTICE: THE ONGOING DEBATE 253 (Joseph J.
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arship that seeks to maximize a social welfare function is scholarship
that considers how to enhance aggregate economic welfare through
tax policy (a “best-results” theory, and also a tax policy focused on
“efficiency”). Scholarship analyzing whether a policy is unfair economically primarily focuses on whether a tax policy unfairly advantages some group over another, usually in an economic sense (in tax
policy “fairness” or “equity”).3 I argue that we should also ask
whether a tax policy is politically just. By politically just, I mean tax
policy that does not hinder an equal voice in our collective decisionmaking, and may even promote it. We should pursue not just a bestresults vision of justice in tax policy, but a popular-will sense of justice
as well.
Others have made a case for the importance of political justice as
democracy in implementing tax policy.4 I join them in stressing the
importance of considering political justness in formulating tax policy
and emphasize why it matters in one arena—tax exemption. I advance
the discussion by arguing that politically just tax policy does the least
harm to the procedural democratic functioning of our government and
may ideally enhance that functioning. I argue that our right to an
equal voice in collective decision-making is the most fundamental
value of political justice (“political voice equality” or “PVE”).
To test this political justice case, I consider the exemption of social
welfare organizations from the U.S. income tax.5 A social welfare organization is a non-profit entity that must be “operated exclusively”
Thorndike & Dennis J. Ventry, Jr. eds., 2002) (arguing equity is a more fundamental
value than efficiency and that we must measure people vertically and horizontally to
ensure equal treatment according to ability and well-being).
3. See, e.g., William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal
Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1115 (1974) (arguing that an income tax unfairly
places a heavier burden on those who invest income in the current year compared to
those who consume). See Michael A. Livingston, Reinventing Tax Scholarship: Lawyers Economists and the Role of the Legal Academy, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 365, 374
(1998) (arguing that the traditional tax policy criteria of efficiency and fairness implicitly take an economics frame).
4. See, e.g., James R. Repetti, Democracy and Opportunity: A New Paradigm in
Tax Equity, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1129, 1131 (2008) [hereinafter Democracy and Opportunity] (arguing that tax policy as fairness should be about providing equal opportunity to all citizens to achieve self-realization); Joseph T. Sneed, The Criteria of Federal
Income Tax Policy, 17 STAN. L. REV. 567, 568 (1965) (arguing that one of the factors
tax policy sets out to accomplish is a “harmony between the income tax and the
sought-after political order”); Clinton G. Wallace, Tax Policy and Our Democracy,
118 MICH. L. REV. 1233 (2020) (arguing we should build the democratic value of
accountability into our making of tax policy); John R. Brooks, The Definitions of Income, 71 TAX L. REV. 253, 253 (2018) (“ ‘[I]ncome’ is whatever society wants it to be
in order to achieve a result that the democracy believes to be appropriate and just.”);
Ari Glogower, Taxing Inequality, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1421, 1449 (2018) (arguing tax
policy should consider relative economic power theory, which shows that we should
limit “opportunities for social dominance resulting from excessive imbalances of economic power”).
5. Social welfare organizations derive an exemption from income tax from 26
U.S.C. § 501(c)(4)(A).
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for the “promotion of social welfare.”6 In addition to the criteria of
efficiency and equity, I ask whether the policy is politically just in a
democratic sense.7 I examine three models of democratic justice: liberal, republican, and deliberative. While I am inclined toward the deliberative form of democracy, I try to find commonalities among the
three in order to determine an agreed-upon notion of democratic justice. Also, I argue that the notion of democratic justice must exist at
the substantive level of the Internal Revenue Code (“Code”) rather
than just in the way tax policy is made, the choice of base or whether
the marginal rate structure is redistributive.8 This Code-level application demonstrates that the typical criteria of efficiency and fairness do
not provide sufficient parameters to evaluate the justice of tax-exempt
policy.
IRS data show that in 2016 over 80,000 social welfare organizations
were registered with the IRS and collectively earned over $86 billion
in revenue.9 Politically active groups like the NRA and the ACLU are
social welfare organizations, as is Karl Rove’s Crossroads GPS, and
other groups that support candidates for office.10 So are some big
health maintenance organizations.11 Finally, the sector is comprised of
Rotary clubs, Kiwanis clubs, kids’ sports associations, homeowners’
associations, and more.
6. Id.
7. Others have made arguments about the justness of policy associated with charities based on political justice. See Robert Atkinson, Keeping Republics Republican,
88 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 235, 246–47 (2011) (arguing that tax policy ought to be
designed in alignment with a republican conception of political justice with a healthy
skepticism of voluntary organizations and most things provided by the state); ROB
REICH, JUST GIVING 195–98 (2018) (referring to the idea that current tax law regarding charity provides too much voice to the wealthy in our democratic order); Philip
Hackney, Prop Up the Heavenly Chorus: Labor Unions, Tax Policy, and Political
Voice Equality, 91 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 315, 317–18 (2017) [hereinafter Prop Up the
Heavenly] (arguing that tax exemption policy for labor and business interests distinctly favored business interests and was therefore not democratically just).
8. My argument in Part I for democracy as justice is largely a procedural argument. As a result, there is a question as to whether I am making a procedural or a
substantive claim. It is both. Congress in passing substantive tax policy is impacting
procedural justice by granting greater benefits to those with greater political voice
already. This is a substantive claim. Additionally, I believe my claim that there is a
political harm from Congress making the IRS make collective value judgments is both
substantive and procedural.
9. JEREMY KHOULISH, FROM CAMPS TO CAMPAIGN FUNDS: THE HISTORY,
ANATOMY AND ACTIVITIES OF 501(C)(4) ORGANIZATIONS 6 (2016), https://
www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/77226/2000594-From-Camps-to-Campaign-Funds-The-History-Anatomy-and-Activities-of-501(c)(4)-Organizations.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U6P2-VRQ7] [hereinafter FROM CAMPS TO CAMPAIGN FUNDS]; see
also Ellen P. Aprill, Examining the Landscape of Section 501(c)(4) Social Welfare
Organizations, 21 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 345, 360–67 (2018) [hereinafter Examining the Landscape] (demonstrating that this number likely significantly undercounts the number of social welfare organizations in existence).
10. See infra Part II (B).
11. See infra Part II (B).
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Social welfare organizations are a significant part of civil society.12
By civil society, I mean the institutional spaces and organizations
outside of the government, and outside of economic power, that facilitate and influence collective decision-making at the state level.13 Civil
society includes institutions such as the press, voluntary organizations,
churches, schools, and places where people publicly congregate. All of
the social welfare sector, including kids’ sports associations and health
maintenance organizations (“HMO”), fit into this broad category. As
such, the social welfare organization sector plays a significant role in
shaping and providing collective goods and services and in developing
collective opinions within civil society and outside of the state.
The social welfare organization tax exemption violates the principle
of providing equal political voice in two ways. First, the policy arbitrarily uses a market model to distribute this tax benefit. This randomly provides a greater subsidy to individuals with greater access to
human and material resources compared to those with limited resources. Second, and equally important, the highly vague standard of
social welfare puts the IRS in the untenable position of deciding which
organizations are furthering our best collective interest. This harms
the citizens of the United States in a political justice sense because it
creates a collective choice mechanism that is not transparent and not
made by citizens. Also, because of the vague standard of social welfare and the requirements of tax privacy, the IRS is forced to make
political judgments in a nontransparent matter for us all. This violates
both equal political voice and its appearance, and in the process harms
the appearance of the neutrality of the IRS.
From a political justice perspective, we should end the policy of tax
exemption for social welfare organizations that engage in education
and advocacy for partisan purposes. Unintuitively, taxing them advances the policy of neutrality as to these interests because it helps
level the playing field between advocacy groups that do not have a tax
benefit and those that do. Providing a tax exemption fails in an equity
sense because the exemption is only available to those interest groups
(i.e., organizations outside the government organized to influence the
government on the interests of its members)14 with the capacity to
12. Peter Dobkin Hall, Philanthropy, the Nonprofit Sector & the Democratic Dilemma, 142 DæDALUS 139, 139 (2013) (noting that nonprofits writ large are widely
regarded as “quintessentially civic institutions,” while at the same time questioning
whether they are all truly above the fray and to be trusted).
13. Jürgen Habermas, Three Normative Models of Democracy, 1 CONSTELLATIONS 1, 8 (1994) [hereinafter Three Normative Models] (arguing that civil society is
outside of the government and the economic power and makes up the facility for
people to form opinions in the public sphere outside of those two significant forces).
For a rich and deep discussion of the role civil society has played in political theory
over a wide range of political theorists and within their theories, see JEAN L. COHEN
& ANDREW ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL THEORY (4th ed. 1992).
14. See Philip T. Hackney, Taxing the Unheavenly Chorus: Why Section 501(c)(6)
Trade Associations Are Undeserving of Tax Exemption, 92 DEN. U. L. REV. 265, 273
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make use of this governmental benefit. Additionally, the exemption
fails in an efficiency sense because it delivers a benefit to those who
do not need the help and gives nothing to those who do. A far better
policy in a political justice sense would be for the government to give
every person in the United States $100 a year to give to interest
groups or advocacy organizations that best represent their interests.
What about the other social welfare organizations that provide collective services or goods rather than advocate positions? For instance,
Delta Dental, described in Part II.B, provides insurance for dental services. Rotary Club, described in Part II.B, connects businesspeople in
a community to meet and speak with one another about important
community matters and to provide community service. Homeowners’
associations provide security, maintenance, and connectivity for
neighborhoods.
Neither fairness nor efficiency analyses help much in assessing these
organizations, but the political justice analysis provides insight. Tax
exemption for the other category of social welfare organizations fails
on political justice grounds for two reasons, both associated with the
vague standard applied. First, our collective decisions should be made
by a process that values PVE. A representative body of the people
should shape what collective goods get the imprimatur and benefits of
the government. Instead, that imprimatur and benefit is delivered arbitrarily and primarily through a market mechanism. The IRS and
courts do their best with a vague standard set by Congress, but the
result is haphazard, as the IRS itself recognizes, but fundamentally the
decisions are driven by an agency and courts rather than Congress.
That arbitrariness is exacerbated because the benefit accrues in
greater amount through a market mechanism to any organization that
has greater resources and is more successful economically because the
primary benefit flows from taxes avoided. Second, though the IRS has
issued some guidance that is transparent, the IRS does a lot of work in
shaping the legal lines of the benefit through its application system.
That system lacks transparency. This both prevents all citizens from
shaping these collective decisions and carries out that activity in a
nontransparent manner. From a political justice standpoint, I believe
we would be better off eliminating the exemption altogether.
Like others, I am not expecting Congress to eliminate tax exemption for social welfare organizations any time soon.15 If we are to
maintain the tax preference, political justice would demand Congress
clarify which organizations should qualify.16 Clearer Congressional
(2015) [hereinafter Taxing the Unheavenly] (citing JOHN R. WRIGHT, INTEREST
GROUPS AND CONGRESS: LOBBYING, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND INFLUENCE 22–23 (1996)
(defining the term interest group)).
15. See Examining the Landscape, supra note 9, at 359.
16. Admittedly, this would seem to be in some conflict with an argument I made
in a prior article regarding how rules might be best adopted regarding charitable orga-
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rules could eliminate some transparency concerns and highlight that
representatives of the people democratically determined the categories of organizations to receive the benefit of tax exemption. We could
also aim to improve the democratic nature of social welfare organizations. For instance, we might adopt principles that the three democratic traditions agree upon in what civil society ideally would look
like. I discuss these possibilities more in Part IV below.
I also compare the political justice analysis with two theories that
have emerged as the dominant rationales for tax exemption:17 contract failure and government failure. In contract failure, there is a failure of the market to provide certain important goods and services.18
Tax exemption is then viewed as a subsidy to help provide a more
efficient level of those goods and services. In the latter, our government will only provide the collective services and goods of the median
voter.19 Under this theory, many view tax exemption as a subsidy to
allow minority groups to provide the collective goods and services
they desire that the government does not provide. I conclude that
while these two efficiency-based theories continue to offer a useful
lens to consider tax policy on the matter of tax exemption, adding a
political justness factor is vital because it enhances tax policy design.
The two theories (contract failure and government failure) are myopic
because they determine a sense of justness based on a vision of a perfect market. As for the application of a political justice critique to the
rest of the tax code, this Article concludes that such a project is a
worthwhile endeavor.
Part I explains the adoption of a political justice analysis to critique
tax policy and considers its benefits and its limitations. Part II discusses the positive law associated with social welfare organizations
and describes and categorizes some of the activities that take place in
the sector. Part III considers previous analyses of theories of tax exemption, including those that focus upon social welfare organizations.
Part IV analyzes the exemption from income tax for social welfare
nizations. See Philip Hackney, Charitable Organizations Oversight: Rules v. Standards,
13 PITT. TAX REV. 83, 85 (2015). I argued Congress ought adopt broad standards and
allow the IRS to adopt more specific rules to regulate the charitable sector. Id. It still
gives me pause to have Congress adopt more specific rules in this sector. Perhaps
there is a way to make the IRS process more publicly accountable so that it would be
seen and be more democratic in nature. This is beyond the scope of this Article
though.
17. There is much scholarship that looks at the rationale for charitable contribution deductions. These are different and I am not expressly discussing them here. See,
e.g., William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 309, 346 (1972).
18. Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from
Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 66, 68 (1981) [hereinafter The
Rationale].
19. Burton Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Nonprofit Sector in a
Three-Sector Economy, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS 21, 26 (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 1986) [hereinafter Theory of the Voluntary].
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organizations as well as the tax treatment of contributions, both from
an income tax and a gift tax perspective. Part V concludes.
II. WHY POLITICAL JUSTICE?
In this Part, I argue that tax policy analysis ought to include a political justice analysis. In other words, rather than focusing only on a
best-results analysis (in a largely economic sense), we ought to consider matters of a just and legitimate political system. That system
should promote PVE or at least not hinder it. The traditional tax policy values of equity and efficiency are largely driven by a best-results
vision of justice.20 We ought to consider a popular-will sense of justice
as well.
I first develop the moral case for why political justice is grounded in
a democratic order and why it is an important value to consider in
addition to efficiency and equity in evaluating tax policy. Because
pure democracy is utopian in nature, however, I consider a few archetypal models of democracy in an imperfect, pluralistic world. Reviewing these models allows us to apply real-world democratic options to
tax policy. The three models include liberal, republican, and deliberative democracy. Though I have in mind a more deliberative democracy vision, I include the other two to see where the three may have
some commonalities. In those commonalities, we might find principles
to inform a political justice upon which we could have a consensus to
make tax policy. Finally, I consider how we ought to think about the
role of political justice as applied to the tax system.
A. Why Democratic Justice Instead of Another Type of Justice?
What are the fundamental criteria people use when they argue
about the wisdom of a particular tax? Typically, experts discuss equity,
efficiency, and administrability. For instance, the income tax is
thought to be equitable because a taxpayer pays tax based on her ability to pay, with income determining the ability to pay.21 This is argua20. Steuerle, supra note 2, at 253.
21. Alan Gunn, The Case for an Income Tax, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 370, 379 (1979).
There are other senses of justice that philosophers have considered, such as the benefit principle, i.e., we should be taxed in accord with the benefits we receive from government or taxation ought to be transactional. Id. at 373. This also suggests a
“distributive” sense of justice—i.e., we each get our just desserts based on how much
we benefit from government activity. Of course, in the economic sense of efficiency,
in a perfect market with perfect information, any tax, except a lump sum tax, is inefficient necessarily because it harms the distributional system of the market. For a defense of the ability to pay principle and a critique of the benefit principle and the new
benefit principle, see Joseph M. Dodge, Theories of Tax Justice: Ruminations on the
Benefit, Partnership, and Ability to Pay Principles, 58 TAX L. REV. 399, 405–06,
450–51 (2005).
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bly fair based on the equal economic sacrifice of all taxpayers.22 A
broad-based income tax is thought to be efficient, and thus perhaps
just, because it generally taxes all sources of income the same.23 As
such, it does not distort market choices beyond the tax charge laid
across the economy.24 Someone might contend that efficiency can be
considered just in a utilitarian sense because it might lead to greater
social welfare.25 Regardless of its just nature, in arguing for the correctness of a tax, experts today rely much on economic analysis and
largely on a tax’s capacity to efficiently distribute burdens across taxpayers. This economic critique in tax today is king.
Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel famously argued that tax scholarship that focuses on equity and efficiency is myopic.26 By assuming
individuals are entitled to their pretax income, tax theories operate on
a presupposition that the right to private property is a natural right
rather than a socially constructed right.27 In other words, private property does not exist without the invention of the state, and a state does
not exist without revenue from tax. Murphy and Nagel contend that
both the equity and efficiency arguments rely upon this incorrect presupposition and lead tax scholars down arguments that rely upon false
propositions. That myopia includes another presupposition: that the
market is a just way of distributing scarce goods and power. As Jane
Mansbridge states, economists “not only accept the ‘marketplace’ vision of a society based on self-interest but make it an ideal.”28 Tax
theorists arguably often do the same—Nagel and Murphy argue we
22. See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, Book 5,
Chapter 2, § 2 (1885) (“Equality of taxation, therefore, as a maxim of politics, means
equality of sacrifice.”); LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP 20–30 (2002) [hereinafter MYTH OF OWNERSHIP] (broadly discussing ability to
pay rationales that are more extensive than equal sacrifice).
23. Uniform Taxation, supra note 1, at 62–63. Some have argued that a consumption tax is more efficient than an ideal broad-based income tax. See Weisbach &
Bankman, supra note 1. Because the current exemption is from income tax, this Article focuses upon exemption within an income tax.
24. Uniform Taxation, supra note 1, at 62–63. Progressive and regressive rates
challenge this rationale of course, but there may be reasons of efficiency to lay different rates across the economy as demonstrated by Zolt and Ramsey. Others fundamentally question whether there is any content in the idea of efficiency at all. See Neil
H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, A Tale of Two Formalisms: How Law and Economics Mirrors Originalism and Textualism, 106 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2020)
(stating: “the very idea of efficiency is empty without a highly contestable set of value
judgments”).
25. MYTH OF OWNERSHIP, supra note 22, at 23 (discussing the utilitarian justice
basis of such arguments).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 8.
28. JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY 17 (Univ. Chi.
Press rev. ed. 1983); see also Douglas Rae, The Limits of Consensual Decision, 69 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 1270, 1270 (1975) (discussing that Knut Wicksell, Buchanan, and Tullock are wrong in claiming that consensual decision is socially efficient).
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should focus on societal justice rather than tax justice as we consider
tax policy.29
From an economics perspective, the distribution of resources
through perfect market mechanisms is ideal because they supposedly
deliver goods to those who value them most highly. But, standing on
economics alone fails to do justice—to the extent the economic domain cares for moral matters it tends to define them in a utilitarian
manner alone.30 The economic method of critique is hollow because it
fails to acknowledge the moral dimension of distributing scarce resources. It is hollow also because it does not fully describe the world
within which we live. The market cannot actually clear all goods in an
economically efficient manner. There is no pure market.31 We need a
government as a collective decision-making system to create and
maintain social structures within which the market operates and
through which the market is controlled. The focus on economics in tax
policy scholarship obscures this necessary relationship of the system of
taxation to the provision of collective properties.
Our system of taxation bears a fundamental relationship with our
collective use of resources and our providing of collective properties.
The idea of a collective property of society is one which “in order to
change one person’s welfare with regard to this property one must
change all or almost all of the other members’ welfare with regard to
it.”32 Collective properties include our laws that regulate ownership of
property, laws to regulate the environment, and the distribution of
resources. This list is likely endless, and endlessly debatable, but
makes up the stuff of which we in society make laws about and operate a government to enforce. We raise taxes to provide these collective
properties, and the tax system in turn is a collective property. Importantly, the tax system itself creates and makes changes to collective
properties existing in society.
If economics alone cannot establish the justness of a tax system,
where might we look? Because taxation is a necessary element in establishing and maintaining a state in order to provide collective
properties, it necessarily impacts questions of political justice. As
James Repetti notes, the tax base and its progressivity should be
shaped with thoughts of political justice in the sense of equality of
opportunity.33 I contend that the justice of the tax system should not
simply end at the construction of the base and its progressive nature,
29.
30.
31.
32.

MYTH OF OWNERSHIP, supra note 22, at 173.
KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 21 (1974).
Id. at 22.
THOMAS CHRISTIANO, THE RULE OF THE MANY: FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN
DEMOCRATIC THEORY 60 (1996) [hereinafter RULE OF THE MANY].
33. Democracy and Opportunity, supra note 4, at 1143 (“A tax system should be
designed to achieve equal opportunity for self-realization as one of its principal
goals.”).
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nor just in the procedures used to enact it. We should consider ways in
which individual code provisions may impact political justice.
By political, I mean how we decide what the group is going to do.
There are a few different primary answers to the question of who
ought to decide what the group is going to do: (a) no one, or anarchy;
(b) some select group of people, or guardianship; and (c) everyone, or
democracy.
In a previous article, I discussed why we should prefer democracy as
a matter of political justice over other forms of government such as
guardianship or anarchy.34 The case for democracy is based on the
principle of intrinsic equality.35 That is to say that no one is better
than an individual in deciding what that individual should do in life.
As a result, all individuals ought to have an equal say in what a relevant group decides to do. As Thomas Christiano explains, “[a] person’s right to participate in the shaping of the world she shares in
common with others, which characterizes a well-functioning democracy, is grounded in her fundamental interests as a member of political
society.”36
Democracy demands more than majority-rule governance.37 Crucially, each member of a group (typically all competent adults) must
have an equal and real opportunity to have a say in the group’s
agenda. This means government should afford all individuals the ability to ask questions, seek relevant information, and hear arguments
such that all individuals have an opportunity to fully understand the
consequences of the decision at hand. Additionally, everyone must
have a vote in any final decision. These requirements establish a principle Robert Dahl referred to as inclusion,38 and that value can also be
described as political voice equality.
Christiano adds another element to the principles of democracy. To
have equality, equality must be seen—it must be publicly realized.39
Institutions “must be able to display the fact of their justice to ordinary persons.”40 This is consistent with Immanuel Kant’s formula of
public right: “[a]ll actions affecting the rights of other human beings
are wrong if their maxim is not compatible with their being made pub34. Prop Up the Heavenly, supra note 7, at 316.
35. In sketching that account of democracy, I relied significantly upon the work of
Robert Dahl. In particular: ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1989)
[hereinafter DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS]; ROBERT A. DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY (2d
ed. 2015); ROBERT A. DAHL, HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION?
(2d ed. 2003); and ROBERT A. DAHL, ON POLITICAL EQUALITY (2006) [hereinafter
ON POLITICAL EQUALITY].
36. THOMAS CHRISTIANO, THE CONSTITUTION OF EQUALITY: DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY AND ITS LIMITS 12 (2008) [hereinafter CONSTITUTION OF EQUALITY].
37. See, e.g., John Dewey, Democracy and Educational Administration, in INTELLIGENCE IN THE MODERN WORLD: JOHN DEWEY’S PHILOSOPHY 400 (1939).
38. DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 35, at 126–27.
39. CONSTITUTION OF EQUALITY, supra note 36, at 46.
40. Id. at 51.

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\8-2\TWL206.txt

282

unknown

Seq: 12

TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW

3-FEB-21

13:40

[Vol. 8

lic.”41 In effect, the only way we can each know that we are getting
equal respect in our polity is if that equality is public. The state itself is
the most important institution in establishing this public reality.42
The implications for the tax system of PVE and publicity mean that
to be politically just, a tax system both should not harm PVE and
should not be perceived to harm PVE. The premise of this Article,
then, is that our tax policy ought not be designed in a way that hurts
democratic functioning. A further premise is that we could design tax
policy to improve that functioning. Finally, it is important that the tax
system not be seen to harm PVE.
Of course, large states cannot possibly meet the requirements of
pure democracy and thus theorists within the democratic tradition
must work on theories of polyarchy—the rule of the many—instead.
This has consequences for how we ought to think about realistic political justice.
The next Section thus reviews efforts to derive a democratic order
workable in a plural world. First, I consider the elements Dahl suggests are necessary for a state to function well as a democratic order.
Additionally, I consider three models of democracy: republican, liberal, and deliberative. These systems of democratic thought detail how
such democratic values and arrangements might apply to substantive
tax policy. I focus on the role of civil society in each of these traditions
in the Section below.
B. Three Democratic Traditions
Once a group has achieved some size, ideal democracy becomes impossible. In order to be democratic in nature, political theorists have
determined that a polyarchy must adopt certain principles.43 It must
allow the election of representatives of the people on a frequent basis.44 There must be freedom of speech to discuss matters of importance to the political system.45 Institutions outside of the government
must provide robust information regarding the decisions before the
government.46 There should be no hindrance on the formation of associations, particularly of political variety, and all individuals should
have each of these freedoms.47 Dahl lists seven specific institutions
that are critical to a well-functioning polyarchy: (1) elected officials;
(2) free and fair elections; (3) inclusive suffrage; (4) right to run for
41. Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, in KANT: POLITICAL
WRITINGS 126 (Hans Reiss ed., Nisbet trans., 1971).
42. CONSTITUTION OF EQUALITY, supra note 36, at 53.
43. See DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 35, at 221–22.
44. Id. at 221.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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office; (5) freedom of expression; (6) alternative information; and (7)
associational autonomy.48
These principles alone do not ensure a just practical democratic political system. We can get deeper into this question of what a just democratic system might look like, though, by looking at a number of
democratic political traditions. As noted above, I focus on three primary traditions:49 liberal, republican, and deliberative democracy.
These traditions order society a bit differently and prioritize different
values. But they also espouse common principles that can guide the
formation of tax policy: the importance of recognizing the equal rights
of citizens, the promotion of freedoms of speech and association, and
the deep importance of civil society in protecting these rights.
Liberal and republican theories pursue distinctly different perspectives.50 The liberal theory comes from the perspective of the individual, while the republican pursues that of the universal.51 An individual
perspective prioritizes individual rights and thus builds political protections for individual freedom.52 For instance, the United States Bill
of Rights emphasizes individual freedoms.53 A universal perspective
prioritizes the group instead of the individual.54 The French people,
for instance, prioritize the state in making decisions for the entirety of
the country.55 The procedural or deliberative democratic theories try
to marry those two perspectives.56 These seek to give honor to both
the individual and the state through reasoned, structured dialogue to
generate a consensus will.57
These democratic traditions all struggle with a major challenge: the
members of a political society fulfill two roles—that of maker of government and its matter.58 Individuals are both the agents and the ob48. Id.
49. Jürgen Habermas, Three Normative Models of Democracy, in THE INCLUSION
OF THE OTHER 239, 239 (Ciaran Cronin & Pablo De Greiff eds., 1998) [hereinafter
INCLUSION OF THE OTHER]. Robert Dahl also works generally from these traditions in
DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 35, at 224–33. There are many strains of
democratic theory and different ways to describe them. See, e.g., Jud Mathews, Minimally Democratic Administrative Law, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 605, 613, 635 (2016) [hereinafter Minimally Democratic] (describing three American democratic traditions of
pluralist, civic republican, and presidentialist that have been influential on our U.S.
administrative law, while introducing the idea of democratic minimalism to administrative law).
50. See INCLUSION OF THE OTHER, supra note 49, at 239–40.
51. See id. at 240–41.
52. See id. at 241.
53. See U. S. CONST. amend. I–X.
54. See id.
55. Id. at 115.
56. Id. at 246.
57. Id. at 248.
58. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 247 (Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1929) [hereinafter LEVIATHAN]. See also JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, 448
(William Rehg trans., 1996) [hereinafter BETWEEN FACTS] (discussing modern law’s
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jects of government.59 Thus, an individual and an association are
always conflicted.60 The individual has the right to make the laws, but
the association will often make laws that are in conflict with certain
individual beliefs.61
The liberal-democratic theorist prioritizes protecting individual
rights in that conflict.62 Liberal theory, centered on the work of John
Locke, emphasizes private property rights.63 The state is a mechanism
to protect individual rights within a market frame-of-mind.64 In the
liberal-democratic view, a citizen’s “voting decisions have the same
structure as the acts of choice made by participants in a market.”65
Still, a liberal-democratic theorist supports political equality as an instrumental way to protect an individual’s right to self-determination.66
The liberal model values civil society associations to bring citizen
political voice to the legislature.67 But, the liberal model views associations in a market model.68 John R. Wright, for instance, argues
interest groups bring important information to the legislature to allow
it to make better policies and laws.69 The liberal model is therefore
often referred to as a pressure-group model.70 Liberal theorists argue
that pressure groups ought to be diverse and balanced so that the legislature is best able to find the most supported ideas.71 Additionally,
liberal theorists promote the idea that civil society might provide
goods to a minority population that are different from those that are
provided by the majoritarian state.72 Civil society provides a place to
allow experimentation.
Janus-faced nature where its addressees can see law as a command or view it as part
of living a well-ordered life).
59. See LEVIATHAN, supra note 57.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 247, 251.
62. Frank Michelman, Political Truth and the Rule of Law, 8 TEL AVIV U. STUD.
L., 281, 283 (1988) [hereinafter Political Truth].
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Three Normative Models, supra note 13, at 3.
66. See id. at 2.
67. Elizabeth S. Clemens, The Constitution of Citizens: Political Theories of Nonprofit Organizations, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 207, 208
(Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg eds., Yale Univ. Press 2d ed. 2006).
68. Id. at 207.
69. JOHN R. WRIGHT, INTEREST GROUPS AND CONGRESS 174 (2003).
70. See RULE OF THE MANY, supra note 32, at 251 (1996).
71. See id. (citing first Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers, Secondary Associations and
Democratic Governance, 20 POL. & SOC’Y 393, 424 (1992), and then citing HANNAH
PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 142 (1967) [hereinafter CONCEPT OF
REPRESENTATION]).
72. James Douglas, Political Theories of Nonprofit Organization, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 43, 47 (Walter W. Powell ed., 1987).
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For the republican view, individuals obtain their highest achievement through collectively governing themselves at the state level.73
While republican theorists support a representative democracy, they
neither support it for equality’s sake, nor because they explicitly support the right to democratic participation.74 Instead, the republican
theorist believes the individual finds virtue and freedom in a cooperative endeavor with the state.75 “[G]overnment should rest on wisdom
and not on will; the good of the nation emerges not from a general will
but from ‘the general reason of the whole.’ ”76
Republican theory supports the primacy of the equality of the people of the community.77 This common will is typically anchored in a
cultural or religious tradition that provides substantial presuppositions
for the proper order of the state.78 The republican theorist fears the
corruption of the government by faction.79 By faction, I mean groups
representing selfish interests of citizens against the common interests
of all the people of the state.80 In the older republican traditions, the
theorists argued the defense against factions lay in aristocratic governance with some power shared with the many, such as the British
House of Commons.81 In the modern thread of republicanism, the defense against faction involves the separation of powers as recommended by Montesquieu.82
All the same, republican theorists recognize associations within the
state and civil society as critical to a just political order.83 As republicans began to accept the idea of a representational democracy, and as
the state increased in size and diversity, republican theorists began to
also accept the importance of groups to represent individual interests.84 Some republican advocates like Philip Pettit argue that
73. INCLUSION OF THE OTHER, supra note 49, at 247. See also Political Truth,
supra note 62, at 284.
74. PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT
8 (1997) [hereinafter FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT].
75. Id.
76. CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION, supra note 71, at 169 (citing Samuel H. Beer,
The Representation of Interests in British Government: Historical Background, 51 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 613, 616 (1957) (trying to encapsulate the thought of Edmund Burke)).
77. See Three Normative Models, supra note 13, at 2; see also DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 47 (3d ed. 2006) [hereinafter MODELS OF DEMOCRACY]; DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 35, at 25.
78. See Three Normative Models, supra note 13, at 2.
79. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 47 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
80. See id. at 48.
81. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 245–46 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed.,
2009); see also DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 35, at 25; Atkinson, supra
note 7, at 246–47. Obviously, Madison in The Federalist Papers talked about the concern of faction. He recommended a large government with a separation of powers to
ensure against this form of corruption.
82. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 81, at 245–46.
83. DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 35, at 30.
84. Id.
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nondomination by the state is an important value and believe civil
society is critical to preventing this type of domination.85
Others find the republican and liberal theories problematic. Jane
Mansbridge, for example, sees the liberal and republican models as
dead ends of adversary democracy, solely based on self-interest.86 This
is Hobbes’s model of politics where humans pursue “[p]ower after
power, that ceaseth [only] in [d]eath,”87 and deliberative democracy
was born in this space.88 There are many versions of deliberative democracy, but I rely primarily upon the views of Jürgen Habermas’s
discourse theory to present that case.89 Though he draws from republican and liberal theories, he rejects both as failing to provide a just
system.
Two facts significantly inform Habermas’s theory: the plurality of
today’s world and the governance disaster of World War II. By plurality of today’s world, I mean a society that is divided along “segmental
cleavages.”90 “This exists where political divisions follow very closely,
and especially concern lines of objective social differentiation.”91 The
consequence of this plural world is a lack of one unifying cultural belief, such as a common religion, to provide a common base upon
which to construct our governance. This leads Habermas to anchor
just governance in a community operating with a shared concept of
communicative action.92 The lesson from World War II for Habermas
is the potential of the state to destroy the individual. This latter fact
means that it is important to build safeguards for individuals from
state domination.
Deliberative democracy calls on us to hold “a multi-perspectival
mode of forming, defending, and thereby refining our preferences.”93
A successful and politically just system in this tradition “depends not
on a collectively acting citizenry but on the institutionalization of the
corresponding procedures and conditions of communication, as well
85. FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT, supra note 74, at 148. This notion of non-domination is seen in legal scholarship as well. Jud Mathews, for instance, argues for a
democratic minimalism to guide administrative law in part on the claim that political
systems should at least be “built around the concept of non-domination—in essence,
the idea that people should not be vulnerable in their basic interests to arbitrary or
unfair exercises of power.” Minimally Democratic, supra note 49, at 635.
86. MANSBRIDGE, supra note 28, at 17.
87. LEVIATHAN, supra note 58, at 75.
88. See BETWEEN FACTS, supra note 58, at 287–328.
89. Id. at 169–70.
90. AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES 3 (1977).
91. Id. (citing HARRY ECKSTEIN, DIVISION AND COHESION IN DEMOCRACY: A
STUDY OF NORWAY 34 (1966)).
92. See BETWEEN FACTS, supra note 58, at 3–6.
93. C. Offe & U. Preuss, Democratic Institutions and Moral Resources, in POLITICAL THEORY TODAY 169 (David Held ed., 1991).
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as on the interplay of institutionalized deliberative processes with informally developed public opinions.”94
Habermas’s discourse theory is different from republican theory because it is decentered from the state.95 While the general will is determined by deliberative processes at the level of the state, like in a
republican model, that general will is more deeply informed by an informal public will developed at the level of civil society. Additionally,
Habermas prioritizes a constitution in his discourse theory to institutionalize the process of communication leading to the formation of the
general will.96 The theory differs from liberalism because it does not
employ constitutional norms to regulate a market mechanism, and it
envisions a civil society separate from both the state and economic
power.97
Deliberative democracy depends upon two spheres of communicative action.98 Habermas’s communicative action provides that individuals have the capability to use their language to communicate with
others, verify claims, and take group-oriented action based upon that
communication.99 Habermas argues there needs be one sphere of
communicative action at the legislative/administrative level that includes the branches of government and political parties that engage in
discursive rationalization to create law, and another as an autonomous
public sphere anchored by civil society.100 The public sphere/civil society is a separate space from the economic and the administrative and
must be strong enough to maintain its own both against money and
the administrative state.101
The public sphere includes conversations in taverns and on the
streets, at rock concerts in theaters, and gatherings at churches, and
also isolated individuals digesting media on their own.102 That public
sphere needs be open and inclusive. It cannot harden into an organization, and it must have “unrestricted inclusion.”103 The public sphere
develops informal, constructed opinions that are to be delivered
through a “sluice” to the administrative structure.104 That public
sphere needs “sufficiently inclusive participation” but its success relies
more upon “the formal criteria governing how a qualified public opin94. BETWEEN FACTS, supra note 58, at 298.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 298–99.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See id. at 171, 299, 371–73.
101. INCLUSION OF THE OTHER, supra note 49, at 249.
102. BETWEEN FACTS, supra note 58, at 374.
103. Id.
104. Cf. CONSTITUTION OF EQUALITY, supra note 36, at 196 (questioning the reasonableness of this assumption of Habermas that political will formation is likely to
happen).
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ion comes about.”105 In Habermas’s vision of the public sphere, formal criteria demands participants take a second-person attitude and
grant communicative freedom to the other in a “linguistically constituted public space.”106 An energetic civil society is needed to protect
liberal rights such as freedom of speech, association, assembly, press,
and also the integrity and freedom of private life spheres.107
Critics of Habermas’s vision of deliberative democracy argue that
his focus on procedure alone is a failure. Though he recognizes the
inequality of citizen resources, he fails to advocate for a system that
requires an equality of resources, and that failure will lead to a failure
of democratic rights for all.108 Regarding the matter of a welfare state
and the relation between material and legal equality, Habermas states
that “[i]f private and public autonomy are co-original, then this relation can, in the final analysis, be specified only by the citizens themselves.”109 In the end, Habermas believes justice is found primarily in
a just democratic procedure, not in some allocation of resources.110
To summarize, each tradition generally upholds distinctly democratic traditions but each anchors justice in different institutional
structures. Though adherents of each would disagree on much, each
also finds there is an importance in recognizing the equal rights of
citizens, the promotion of freedoms of speech and association, and the
deep importance of civil society in protecting these rights.
C. How Does Democratic Justice Apply to Income Tax?
On its face, it might not appear that the income tax impacts political
justice as it relates to a fair democratic process. We all might agree
that the way a tax is enacted impacts political voice, and that IRS interpretation of a Code section in regulations impacts political voice,111
105. BETWEEN FACTS, supra note 58, at 362.
106. Id. at 361.
107. Id. at 368.
108. William Scheuerman, Between Radicalism and Resignation: Democratic Theory in Habermas’s Between Facts and Norms, in HABERMAS: A CRITICAL READER
162–63 (Peter Dews ed., 1999).
109. BETWEEN FACTS, supra note 58, at 414.
110. See id. at 414–15.
111. There is deep scholarship in administrative law, much of which is focused on
whether unelected bureaucrats of agencies are violating democratic principles when
they engage in both rule writing and enforcement. See, e.g., Minimally Democratic,
supra note 49, and the literature discussed therein. See also Joshua Galperin, The Life
of Administrative Democracy, 108 GEO. L.J. 1213, 1215 (2020) (discussing the democratic literature of agencies in light of an agency, the United States Department of
Agriculture’s farmer committee system, which elects its representatives). Tax law
scholars have considered this question as well. See, e.g., Kristen E. Hickman, The
Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV.
1537, 1549 (2006) (discussing Chevron deference to IRS regulations as in part a matter of democratic accountability); James Puckett, Structural Tax Exceptionalism, 49
GA. L. REV. 1067, 1072 (2015) (discussing tax exceptionalism and judicial deference
to the IRS in its rulemaking activities and the reality that combining “prospective
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but it is likely more difficult to see why democratic justice would apply
to the substance of tax law. Could the tax law have an impact on procedural aspects of democracy? I think so.
Accounting for income from a maker of widgets based on widgets
sold and allowing a deduction for a basic business expense like paying
the salaries of an employee who is making widgets may not seem to
impact political voice equality. Nor would political voice seem to be
playing a role in the tax burden Joe or Mary faced from their $40,000
or $100,000 salary.
Nevertheless, as some have argued, the choice to employ a progressive income tax speaks to democratic justice in that it affects economic
inequality in a political system.112 Because those with greater resources have a greater ability to impact government decisions, a progressive income tax might limit (or increase) disparities in political
voice.113 James Repetti argues that the question of whether to utilize a
progressive income tax is informed by a need to maintain equality of
opportunity.114
How would we determine whether a Code section implicated political justice in a negative way? Considering the different democratic
traditions discussed above, each evinces an interest in some PVE and
the importance of the citizens as a body determining what the group is
going to do. Each of the democratic traditions sees civil society organizations as important in ensuring political voice and ensuring civil
rights, like freedom of speech and association, in constructing a just
political society. Thus, an aspect of the tax law, its procedures, or its
enforcement that impacts these types of arrangements should be candidates for Code sections that might impact political justice in a negative way.
Critical tax scholars have marshaled evidence to show the Code’s
structure often applies in ways that negatively impact certain groups
based on gender, race, or sexual orientation.115 This is a political justice critique. By excluding the voices of individuals from these groups,
we as a country are not providing equal political voice in shaping the
laws in a very visible way. This makes a statement about the value of
the voice of these individuals to the country and simultaneously reinforces that value.
rulemaking, enforcement, and retroactive adjudicatory powers under one umbrella. . . . presents a potential for an agency to overreach or abuse power”).
112. See Democracy and Opportunity, supra note 4, at 1154.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., Beverly I. Moran & William Whitford, A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue Code, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 751 (1996) (arguing that the choices made in the
Code systematically exclude the voices of black citizens from shaping the policies in
the Code); CRITICAL TAX THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION (Anthony C. Infanti &
Bridget J. Crawford eds, 2009).
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With respect to individual Code sections, if, for instance, there was
a tax on the act of voting, we could clearly see an impact on political
justice at the Code level. In the income tax, we tax income, so it might
be a little harder to directly see such a clear procedural democracy
question. Nevertheless, in the income tax, we try to cast a wide net so
that the tax burden is spread across all activity. This also limits opportunities for avoiding the income tax. We also tax every conceivable
entity that might generate income such as corporations, partnerships,
and trusts. While Congress tries to cast that net widely, it removes
certain income generating activity,116 and certain types of entities,
from taxation.117 It also lowers taxation based on deductions or credits
for some activities.118 It is in this space that I want to examine political
justice.
We are used to thinking of the income tax in terms of the incentives
it can provide. To the extent the income tax provides a deduction for
an activity that impacts political voice, the tax is impacting popular
will.119 For instance, allowing a deduction for lobbying expenditures
or for political campaign expenditures impacts political voice.120 Also,
to the extent we do not tax organizations engaged in political voice
activities, we impact popular will.121 In the case of the tax treatment of
labor unions, I argued that we should consider the political voice impact of deductions and tax exemption.122 Problematically, the benefit
to the members of these organizations is of great use to wealthy members with access to expertise who face little in the way of collective
action challenges, and of highly limited use to persons who suffer severe collective action challenges (such as the poor).123
In the analysis below, I consider these same political justice themes
associated with advocacy organizations. But advocacy groups are only
116. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 115.
117. 26 U.S.C. § 501. Also, state and local political entities are in effect generally
exempt from the income tax.
118. See Stanley S. Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reform: The Varied Approaches
Necessary to Replace Tax Expenditures with Direct Governmental Assistance, 84
HARV. L. REV. 352, 353–54 (1970) (discussing the idea of spending through the tax
code as tax expenditures).
119. See Prop Up the Heavenly, supra note 7, at 367.
120. 26 U.S.C. § 162(e) (2018) (prohibiting such deductions).
121. 26 U.S.C. § 527 (2018) (providing tax exemption to political organizations,
though § 527(e) applies a tax to net investment income of these same organizations).
Also, we require an individual who transfers an appreciated asset to a political organization to recognize gain upon the contribution to the political organization. 26 U.S.C.
§ 84.
122. Prop Up the Heavenly, supra note 7 (arguing that Congress’s choice to effectively stop labor union members from deducting union dues while allowing businessmen to deduct their dues was an unjust policy because it harmed the social choice
function).
123. Id. at 340–41.
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a small part of social welfare organizations.124 For instance, over 70%
of social welfare organization revenue is earned by health providers
and insurers.125 How might matters of political justice relate to the tax
policy as applied to these varied groups?
While it might be easy to see that granting some interest groups a
subsidy based on income helps politically active groups in an unjust,
arbitrary manner, it might be harder to see the problem with granting
benefits to an organization that is directly carrying out social welfare.
I believe political justice ought to play a role in how we conceive of
these provisions of collective goods. The next Section reviews the universe of social welfare organizations and the legal structure applied to
this diverse group.
III. SOCIAL WELFARE ORGANIZATION LEGAL REGIME
Social welfare organizations include “[c]ivic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare . . . and no part of the net earnings of which
[entities] inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.”126 It is believed the policy originated out of a comment from the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce when Congress was enacting the income
tax.127 The Chamber argued that certain organizations that perform
“civic functions” should not pay tax.128 Though it might have had noble intentions, the IRS itself has stated that: “section 501(c)(4) has
been used by both the courts and the Service as a haven for organizations that lack the accepted essential characteristics of a taxable entity,
but elude classification under other subparagraphs of 501(c).”129

124. Examining the Landscape, supra note 9, at 347, 367 (discussing that only a
relatively small part of the social welfare organization sector seems to be made up of
advocacy or politically active organizations).
125. FROM CAMPS TO CAMPAIGN FUNDS, supra note 9, at 6.
126. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4) (emphasis added). Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(1) (as
amended in 1990), makes clear that either type of organization must be organized and
operated not for profit and exclusively for the promotion of social welfare.
127. See James J. McGovern, The Exemption Provisions of Subchapter F, 29 TAX
LAW. 523, 530 (1976).
128. See Tariff Schedules of the Revenue Act of 1913: Hearing on H.R. 3321 Before
the Subcomm. of the Comm. on Finance, 63d Cong. 2001 (1913) (statement of United
States Chamber of Commerce). For a closer look at the testimony including the status
of prior law that spurred it, see Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, A (Partial) Defense of
§ 501(c)(4)’s “Catchall” Nature, 21 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 439, 442–45 (2018)
[hereinafter A (Partial) Defense].
129. I.R.S., Social Welfare: What Does it Mean? How Much Private Benefit is Permissible? What is Community?, 1981 EO CPE Text, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/
eotopicg81.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MR6-AJ7X].
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A. The Law Regarding Qualifying as a Social Welfare
Organization
A social welfare organization must operate exclusively for social
welfare purposes and not allow its earnings inure to those who control
the organization.130 The Treasury Department interprets exclusively to
mean “primarily engaged in promoting in some way the common
good and general welfare of the people of the community.”131 A social
welfare organization must exhibit a primary purpose of “bringing
about civic betterments and social improvements.”132 The promotion
of social welfare does not include participating or intervening in a political campaign.133 It also does not include operating a social club or a
for-profit business. Positive collective activity seems to qualify unless
it supports too much of a private purpose.134
The largest complaint about the section is the vagueness of the standard.135 Often, the IRS finds that an organization that did not meet
the requirements of being charitable under section 501(c)(3) fits the
requirements of a social welfare organization. For example, an organization that both assisted older men in finding jobs and educated employers about the benefits of hiring these older men, failed to qualify
as a Section 501(c)(3) organization but qualified under Section
501(c)(4).136 Similarly, an organization that established and maintained a legal facility to build and operate a stadium for a municipality
was not charitable but did promote social welfare.137
In Erie Endowment, an organization failed to qualify because it did
not demonstrate that it was “a community movement designed to accomplish community ends.”138 However, in Eden Hall, the court held
that operating a women’s home as a vacation spot primarily for women who worked for H. J. Heinz Company qualified for social welfare
status.139 The court further stated that an organization that focused on
“one segment or slice of the community” met the standard.140 The
IRS announced it would not follow this decision.141
130. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2) (as amended in 1990).
131. Id. (emphasis added).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See id.
135. See, e.g., Examining the Landscape, supra note 9, at 348 (referring to the
vagueness of the standard as a “no man’s land,” though ultimately concluding it may
serve a useful border boundary guarding purpose). But cf. A (Partial) Defense, supra
note 128, at 445 (suggesting that Congress may very well have intended the broad
standard as it has been applied by the IRS).
136. Rev. Rul. 57-297, 1957-2 C.B. 307.
137. Rev. Rul. 57-493, 1957-2 C.B. 314.
138. Erie Endowment v. United States, 316 F.2d 151, 156 (3d Cir. 1963).
139. Eden Hall Farm v. United States, 389 F. Supp. 858, 859, 866–68 (W.D. Pa.
1975).
140. Id. at 866.
141. Rev. Rul. 80-205, 1980-2 C.B. 184.
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Marshalling resources in a nonprofit organization to solve a lack of
adequate housing for low- and moderate-income groups satisfies the
promotion of social welfare criteria.142 Likewise, a city plan to eradicate unemployment qualifies as a social welfare organization.143 To
eradicate unemployment, corporations and other persons or entities
contributed money.144 The organization then loaned that contributed
money to those who would operate the land.145 The IRS said the organization was “operated primarily to bring about civic betterment
and social improvement.”146 An organization formed to supply water
to residents of a particular community promoted social welfare because it used the profits to “raise the water table.”147
A community-operated bus service convinced the IRS it promoted
social welfare because the services were available to all in the community.148 However, the IRS acknowledged that the service was mostly
used by the group’s founders.149 The IRS similarly approved an organization that operated a rural airport after the FAA found there was a
need for such a service, and the municipality provided the airport land
to operate upon.150
The IRS recognized as exempt an organization formed to clean up
spills in a city port.151 Again, the service was available to everyone in
the port.152 In contrast, the organization in Contracting Plumbers was
found not to promote social welfare153 because the group only repaired potholes caused by plumbers who were members of the organization.154 An organization that transmitted television signals only to
members was found to not be operated primarily for social welfare,155
while an organization that provided television signals to anyone in the
area met the exemption requirements.156
The IRS determined that a credit counseling organization formed to
assist individuals with financial problems qualified as a social welfare
142. Rev. Rul. 55-439, 1955-2 C.B. 257.
143. Rev. Rul. 64-187, 1964-1 C.B. 187.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Rev. Rul. 66-148, 1966-1 C.B. 143.
148. Rev. Rul. 78-69, 1978-1 C.B. 156.
149. Id.
150. Rev. Rul. 78-429, 1978-2 C.B. 178.
151. Rev. Rul. 79-316, 1979-2 C.B. 228.
152. Id.
153. Contracting Plumbers Coop. Restoration Corp. v. United States, 488 F.2d 684,
687 (2d Cir. 1973).
154. Id. at 685, 687.
155. Rev. Rul. 54-394, 1954-2 C.B. 131.
156. Rev. Rul. 62-167, 1962-2 C.B. 142. But cf. Rev. Rul. 55-716, 1955-2 C.B. 263
(stating that “[a]n organization formed for the purpose of furnishing television antenna service to its members is not entitled to exemption from Federal income tax”
under any provision of law).
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organization.157 Congress later became concerned about the abusive
use of this classification and passed new rules to constrain credit counseling organizations.158
Groups organized to engage in pastimes often qualify as social welfare organizations. A gun range that sold annual memberships and ran
gun safety courses was determined to be exempt.159 Similarly, the IRS
found that a roller-skating rink operating at reasonable charge to all in
the community promoted social welfare.160
A series of rulings found that beautification of a city or city areas
can qualify as a social welfare purpose. The IRS determined a neighborhood association to be exempt under Section 501(c)(4) for providing security patrols with membership dues.161 In that ruling, anyone
could become a member, and members and nonmembers alike had
access to those community goods and services provided by the organization.162 The IRS denies status to organizations where residents must
pay money in exchange for beautification or security.163 However, the
IRS determined a group formed to help out businesses and residents
of one city block promoted social welfare.164
Health insurance-related organizations make up the largest amount
of revenue associated with social welfare organizations.165 This is odd,
as in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Congress eliminated commercial
insurance organizations such as Blue Cross Blue Shield from qualifying as exempt from the corporate income tax.166 Many of the Blue
Cross organizations were organized under section 501(c)(4) themselves.167 An IRS Continuing Professional Education (“CPE”) text
from 1981 may provide some clues. In that text, the IRS acknowledged that it has long held certain prepaid medical plans meet the
exemption requirements of a social welfare organization, in spite of
the fact that the IRS has a policy against mutual benefit associations

157. Rev. Rul. 65-299, 1965-2 C.B. 165.
158. 26 U.S.C. § 501(q).
159. Rev. Rul. 66-273, 1966-2 C.B. 222.
160. Rev. Rul. 67-109, 1967-1 C.B. 136.
161. Rev. Rul. 75-386, 1975-2 C.B. 211.
162. Id.
163. Rev. Rul. 77-273, 1977-2 C.B. 195.
164. Rev. Rul. 75-286, 1975-2 C.B. 210.
165. FROM CAMPS TO CAMPAIGN FUNDS, supra note 9, at 6 (representing that
health providers and insurers earned almost $63 billion of the $86 billion of revenue
earned by social welfare organizations, according to the 2014 IRS Business Master
file).
166. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(m).
167. William M. Miller, Phyllis D. Haney & Kenneth J. Earnest, Insurance: The
Rule of ‘86, 1997 EO CPE Text 215, 216, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/
eotopicn97.pdf [https://perma.cc/475K-AHFA].
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so qualifying.168 The IRS published this CPE before the enactment of
section 501(m).169
There is little guidance from the IRS on when an HMO qualifies as
a social welfare organization.170 An IRS audit technique guide simply
restates the basic requirements of operating as a social welfare organization in discussing HMOs.171
An HMO that served “underserved” members of the community
furthered social welfare.172 Organizations called individual practice associations (“IPA”) established pursuant to federal policy associated
with HMOs, however, are not operated exclusively for social welfare
purposes.173 IPAs are entities that are made up of doctors’ practices
that establish compensation arrangements with an HMO and that
share various expenses such as technological and administrative.174 A
court in 2008 found that an organization formed to provide vision insurance for members was not organized and operated exclusively for
social welfare purposes because it operated primarily for its members
rather than “the general welfare of the community.”175
Social welfare organizations can engage in lobbying activities as a
social welfare purpose.176 Lobbying is the activity of trying to persuade a public representative body to vote for or against a decision
that is before that body.177 The IRS has found that lobbying for
animal rights178 and for the rights of the unborn179 are both social welfare purposes. However, the IRS found that an organization engaged
in civil disobedience was engaged in activities “contrary to the common good and the general welfare of the people in a community and
thus are not permissible means of promoting the social welfare.”180
168. I.R.S., supra note 129.
169. Congress amended 26 U.S.C. § 501 to include (m) in 1988. See 26 U.S.C. §
501.
170. That which is out there mostly would suggest that these organizations do not
so qualify. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 75-199, 1975-1 C.B. 160 (explaining that an organization
that paid sick and death benefits to members only did not qualify as a social welfare
organization).
171. I.R.S., Audit Technique Guide – Health Maintenance Organizations, IRS.GOV,
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/atg_hmo.pdf [https://perma.cc/YHL4-Z2P7].
172. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39829 (Sept. 10, 1990).
173. Rev. Rul. 86-98, 1986-2 C.B. 74.
174. Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300e-1(5) (West
2011).
175. Vision Serv. Plan, Inc. v. United States, 265 F. App’x 650, 652 (9th Cir. 2008).
176. Rev. Rul. 68-656, 1968-2 C.B. 216.
177. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (stating “no substantial part of [its] activities . . . is
carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation” and the
regulations thereunder Treas. Reg. 26 U.S.C. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)); see also 26 U.S.C.
501(h)(2) and § 4911(d).
178. Rev. Rul. 67-293, 1967-2 C.B. 185.
179. Rev. Rul. 76-81, 1976-1 C.B. 156.
180. Rev. Rul. 75-384, 1975-2 C.B. 204. See also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States,
461 U.S. 574, 591–92 (1983). See generally Philip Hackney, A Response to Professor
Leff’s Tax Planning “Olive Branch” for Marijuana Dealers, 99 IOWA L. REV. BULL.
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While lobbying activity furthers a social welfare purpose, intervening in political campaigns does not.181 Intervening in a campaign
means to encourage people to vote for or against candidates for public
office.182 An organization that ranked candidates as its primary activity failed to show it was operated for a social welfare purpose because
it provided the ranking to intervene in a campaign.183 However, an
organization can intervene in a political campaign and still qualify as a
social welfare organization as long as it otherwise operates primarily
as a social welfare organization.184
While it is not clear how much political intervention is too much,
the IRS seems to operate on the basis that activities or revenue exceeding 50% of a social welfare organization’s total activities or revenue is too much.185 There are many who argue that the term
“exclusively” found in the statute should be read to allow much less
political activity.186 Others, like the Bright Lines Project, argue that
there is a lack of clarity in the qualitative activities that are considered
political intervention and recommend the IRS adopt clearer rules on
what is political intervention.187
Notably, Congress prohibits a taxpayer from deducting lobbying or
political campaign expenses.188 Until 1962, Treasury regulations prohibited the deduction of lobbying expenses, and the Supreme Court
upheld this limitation in Cammarano v. United States.189 In 1962, Congress permitted the deduction of lobbying expenses on issues germane
to the taxpayer.190 Nevertheless, in 1993, the Clinton administration
25 (2014) (discussing the public policy doctrine as it relates to social welfare
organizations).
181. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1990).
182. Rev. Rul. 67-368, 1967-2 C.B. 194.
183. Id.
184. Rev. Rul. 81-95, 1981-1 C.B. 332. See, e.g., Robert Maguire, How Crossroads
GPS Beat the IRS and Became a Social Welfare Group, OPENSECRETS NEWS (Feb. 12,
2016, 11:42 AM), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2016/02/how-crossroads-gps-beatthe-irs-and-became-a-social-welfare-group/ [https://perma.cc/R3KX-83TR] (describing the battle with the IRS and whether Crossroads was operated primarily for a
social welfare purpose).
185. Examining the Landscape, supra note 9, at 347. The IRS has never defined the
limits. See Ellen P. Aprill, A Case Study of Legislation vs. Regulation: Defining Political Campaign Intervention under Federal Tax Law, 63 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1636–37
(2014).
186. See, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, The IRS’s Tea Party Tax Row: How ‘Exclusively’
Became ‘Primarily’, PAC. STANDARD (June 7, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.psmag.com/
politics/the-irss-tea-party-tax-row-how-exclusively-became-primarily-59451/ [https://
perma.cc/K6KP-J5S9].
187. Drafting Committee Explanation, Interim Draft, The Bright Lines Project:
Clarifying IRS Rules on Political Intervention, PUBLICCITZEN (May 8, 2014), https://
www.citizen.org/wp-content/uploads/migration/may_8_explanation_with_exhibit.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8G8B-5AGF].
188. 26 U.S.C. § 162(e).
189. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
190. 26 U.S.C. § 162(e).
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successfully advocated for Congress to pass a law to again prohibit the
deduction of these expenses.191
The current vague status of the social welfare standard demonstrated above seems to have been a big driver in the Tea Party crisis
that arose in 2013.192 There, many accused the IRS of “targeting” political organizations seeking to qualify as social welfare organizations.193 It appears that the IRS simply did not know how to
determine if an organization was intervening in a campaign and how
much intervention was too much.194
Where an organization primarily engages in influencing elections, it
is then considered for tax purposes as an organization described in
section 527.195 Such an organization still maintains a tax exempt status
but is subject to a tax on investment income.196 Unlike social welfare
organizations, section 527 organizations must publicly disclose their
donors.197 Social welfare organizations that conduct too much political
campaign activity are political organizations under section 527.198 The
IRS has provided guidance as to when certain activity is considered an
exempt function activity under section 527 for social welfare organizations as well as business leagues and labor unions.199 If an activity is
categorized as exempt function activity, the organization comes under
the tax under section 527(f). The IRS permits a social welfare organization to create a segregated fund to operate as a political organization under section 527 subject to certain notice and reporting
requirements.200
The most intense political battle fought over social welfare organizations is whether they must disclose their donors.201 Many refer to
social welfare organizations as “dark money organizations” because
they need not publicly disclose their donors even though they conduct
191. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (“OBRA”) § 13222, Pub. L. No. 103–66,
107 Stat. 312 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. (1993)).
192. Aprill, supra note 185.
193. See Philip Hackney, Should the IRS Never “Target” Taxpayers? An Examination of the IRS Tea Party Affair, 49 VAL. U. L. REV. 453, 453 (2015).
194. See IRS Targeting of Applicants for Tax Exempt Status: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Ways & Means, 103d Cong. (2013) (statement of J. Russell George, Treas.
Inspector Gen.).
195. 26 U.S.C. § 527.
196. 26 U.S.C. § 527(f).
197. Form 990, Return for Organization Exempt from Income Tax, Schedule B
(2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6BS-FM7B].
198. This can create real problems for a social welfare organization because a section 527 organization is supposed to file a notice with the IRS within twenty-four
hours after its formation. 26 U.S.C. § 527(i).
199. Rev. Rul. 2004-6, 2004-1 C.B. 328.
200. Id.
201. See Roger Colinvaux, Social Welfare and Political Organizations: Ending the
Plague of Inconsistency, 21 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 481 (2018) [hereinafter
Plague of Inconsistency]. The IRS recently proposed regulations that would end the
requirement that a social welfare organization disclose its donor names and addresses
to the IRS.
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politically related activity.202 They generally need not disclose their
donors to the Federal Election Commission, except when they engage
in electioneering communications. Additionally, though the IRS used
to require the disclosure of substantial donors to the IRS itself on
Schedule B to the Form 990, in 2020, the Treasury Department
promulgated regulations eliminating the requirement for social welfare organizations to disclose their donors.203 I do not engage the
question of whether social welfare organizations ought disclose their
substantial donors in this Article.
B. What Types of Organizations Make Up the Social Welfare
Organization Community?
A recent Urban Institute study paints a portrait of social welfare
organizations.204 As of 2012, the most numerous type of social welfare
organization was community service clubs like Kiwanis and Rotary
Club.205 Despite representing 39% of social welfare organizations, the
total revenue generated by community service clubs was a little over
$700 million—only 0.8% of the total revenue.206 Health insurance and
health providers were one of the smallest in number, making up only
0.6%, but possessing over 72.5% of the revenue at over $62 billion.207
Homeowner/neighborhood community groups made up about 9.2%
with only about 2.8% of revenue.208 Sports and recreation clubs made
up about 10.1% in number and 3.9% in revenue at around $3.4 billion.209 A large group at 27% fit into a category of other.210 Jeremy
Khoulish suggests that advocacy organizations fit somewhere in this
group.211 That group held 12.5% of revenue at $10.8 billion.212
What follows are some specific examples of types of social welfare
organizations that I will return to again in Part IV. I first look at advocacy-related organizations. Then, I look at a health-related organization. Finally, I consider some specific clubs and homeowners’
associations.
202. Id. at 494.
203. TD 9898, 2020-25 I.R.B. 935.
204. FROM CAMPS TO CAMPAIGN FUNDS, supra note 9. See also Examining the
Landscape, supra note 9, at 360–67 (unpacking the Koulish study and discussing it in
conjunction with data from IRS Data books).
205. FROM CAMPS TO CAMPAIGN FUNDS, supra note 9, at 6.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\8-2\TWL206.txt

2021]

unknown

Seq: 29

POLITICAL JUSTICE AND TAX POLICY

3-FEB-21

13:40

299

1. Advocacy Social Welfare Organizations
The NRA, which earned over $366 million in revenue in 2016 but
lost nearly $46 million, is a social welfare organization.213 The ACLU,
which earned over $139 million in revenue in 2019 and lost almost $7
million, is a social welfare organization, too.214 The NRA states that it
provides firearm safety, training, education and advocacy.215 The
ACLU states that it maintains and advances civil liberties such as
those expressed in the First Amendment of the Constitution.216 Finally, Karl Rove’s organization, Crossroads GPS, qualifies as a social
welfare organization as well—it earned $16 million in revenue in 2016
and had almost $500,000 in earnings.217 It says it advocates for citizens
on legislative issues that will shape our nation’s future.218 There are
numerous large and powerful Democratic and Republican candidaterelated organizations that are exempt as social welfare organizations
as well.219

213. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Form 990: Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax, pt. I, §§ 12, 19, at 1 (2016), https://pp-990-rendered.s3.amazonaws.com/
201722619349300507_full_0.html?X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&XAmz-Credential=AKIA266MJEJYTM5WAG5Y%2F20200827%2Fus-east1%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Date=20200827T021129Z&X-Amz-Expires=
1800&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Signature=d78a3e5418dd09b849d064a
783b91d9f80127cb78eab45a084c1f5a5f70150dc [https://perma.cc/Y7MT-9QF6].
214. See Am. Civil Liberties Union, PROPUBLICA: NONPROFIT EXPLORER, https://
projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/330325795 [https://perma.cc/8JJLFAGJ] (offering PDFs of the ACLU’s Form 990s from 2005 to the present).
215. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Form 990: Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax, supra note 213, pt. 1, § 1, at 1.
216. Am. Civil Liberties Union, Form 990: Return of Organization Exempt from
Income Tax, supra note 214, pt. I, § 1, at 1.
217. Crossroads Grassroots Pol’y Strategies, Form 990: Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax, pt. I, §§ 12, 19, at 1 (2016), https://projects.propublica.org/non
profits/display_990/272753378/12_2017_prefixes_27-30%2F272753378_201612_990O_
2017121315023770 [https://perma.cc/4L58-E83R]. When I state earnings, I mean
something akin to a profit in a nonprofit organization.
218. Id. pt. 3, § 1, at 2.
219. Many politicians, including 2016 presidential candidates Hillary Clinton and
Donald Trump, have social welfare organizations that back their political efforts in
some way. See, e.g., Ashley Balcerzak, Inside Donald Trump’s Army of Super PACs
and MAGA Nonprofits, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Feb. 18, 2019), https://publicintegrity.org/politics/donald-trump-army-super-pacs-maga-nonprofits/ [https://perma.cc/
EM2K-UMP8] (discussing an organization supporting Donald Trump named America
First Policies); Dave Levinthal, Inside Hillary Clinton’s Big Money Calvary, CTR. FOR
PUB. INTEGRITY (Apr. 13, 2016, 11:10 AM), https://publicintegrity.org/politics/insidehillary-clintons-big-money-cavalry/ [https://perma.cc/SS95-M2MR] (discussing an organization supporting Hillary Clinton named American Bridge 21st Century
Foundation).
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2. Health-Related Social Welfare Organizations
Delta Dental affiliates exist in all forty-nine states across the country.220 They operate as nonprofit organizations that qualify as tax exempt social welfare organizations.221 The largest, Delta Dental of
California, generated over $5.4 billion in revenue in 2018 and earned
profits over $171 million.222 These organizations work to advance dental health through dental health benefits, technology, and support.223
It is mystifying that Delta Dental continues to qualify under social
welfare status because the IRS successfully revoked the tax exempt
status of Vision Services affiliates around the country.224 The primary
reason Vision Services lost its status was because it operated almost
exclusively to assist only its members rather than improving the community.225 On its face, Delta Dental appears to do the same.
3. Service-Club Social Welfare Organizations
Kiwanis International, a social welfare organization, describes itself
as “a global organization dedicated to improving the world one child
and one community at a time.”226 Kiwanis International appears to be
the head of the Kiwanis clubs system.227 It earned about $18 million in
revenue in the 2018 fiscal year, with about $1 million in investment
income.228 Additionally, it incurred about $18 million in expenses and
220. Delta Dental Member Companies and Operating States, DELTA DENTAL,
https://www.deltadental.com/us/en/about-us/delta-dental-member-companies.html
[https://perma.cc/9DD9-UB9T].
221. About Us, DELTA DENTAL, https://www.deltadental.com/us/en/about-us.html
[https://perma.cc/AY85-8VCE]; see, e.g., Delta Dental of Cal., PROPUBLICA: NONPROFIT EXPLORER, https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/941461312
[https://perma.cc/N58C-8BE2]; Delta Dental of Wash., PROPUBLICA: NONPROFIT EXPLORER, https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/910621480 [https://
perma.cc/Q8Z7-ZM23]; Delta Dental Plan of Mich., PROPUBLICA: NONPROFIT EXPLORER, https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/381791480 [https://
perma.cc/YF86-TBSA]; Delta Dental Plan of Va., PROPUBLICA: NONPROFIT EXPLORER, https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/540844477 [https://
perma.cc/P7AS-Y6F8]; Delta Dental of Pa., PROPUBLICA: NONPROFIT EXPLORER,
https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/231667011 [https://perma.cc/
Z3GW-NAFM].
222. Delta Dental of California, Form 990: Return of Organization Exempt from
Income Tax, pt. I, §§ 12, 19, at 1 (2018), https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/941461312/201903179349301005/full [https://perma.cc/NK5A-9H6W].
223. Id. pt. 3, § 1, at 2.
224. Vision Serv. Plan, Inc. v. United States, 265 F. App’x 650, 652 (9th Cir. 2008).
225. Id. at 651.
226. Kiwanis Int’l Inc., Form 990: Return of Organization Exempt from Income
Tax, pt. I, § 1, at 1 (2017), https://pdf.guidestar.org/PDF_Images/2018/361/327/2018361327510-11167682-9O.pdf [https://perma.cc/W2DB-P44U].
227. See The Structure of Kiwanis, KIWANIS INT’L, https://www.kiwanis.org/about/
structure-of-kiwanis [https://perma.cc/72N2-54Y3].
228. Kiwanis Int’l, Inc., Form 990: Return of Organization Exempt from Income
Tax, pt. 1, §§ 10, 12, at 1 (2018), https://pdf.guidestar.org/PDF_Images/2018/361/327/
2018-361327510-11167682-9O.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6KS-CBJ8].
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held almost $35 million in assets.229 There are then a series of districts
that make up Kiwanis International, such as the Cal-Nev-Ha District
of Kiwanis International, which brought in about $2.3 million in revenue and about $2.3 million in expenses in the 2018 fiscal year.230 Once
you start getting into the club level, the revenue is typically under $1
million a year.231 GuideStar is also filled with charitable organizations
of similar sizes associated with the districts and the clubs.232 There are
around 5,000 clubs and over 140,000 members in the United States
according to Kiwanis.233
Rotary International is much larger—it brought in over $106 million in revenue and about $95 million in expenses in 2018.234 It earned
$11 million in investment income and holds a total of $172 million in
assets.235 Its mission is providing service to others, “and [it] advances
world understanding, goodwill and peace through [its] fellowship of
business, professional, and community leaders.”236 It has very large
associated charities, including the Rotary Foundation of Rotary International, which holds over $1.25 billion in assets.237 The clubs themselves appear to be relatively small businesses, like the Kiwanis clubs.
Rotary reports over 337,000 members in the United States.238
4. Homeowners’ Association Social Welfare Organizations
Though many homeowners’ associations are quite small, there are
some large homeowners’ associations, such as the Association of Poinciana Villages, Inc.,239 out of Kissimme, Florida and the Riverstone
Homeowners Association out of Sugarland, Texas.240 Poinciana
earned about $9.7 million in revenue and about $9.2 million in ex229. Id.
230. Cal-Nev-Ha Dist. of Kiwanis Int’l, Form 990: Return of Organization Exempt
from Income Tax, pt. 1, §§ 12, 18, at 1 (2018), https://pdf.guidestar.org/PDF_Images/
2018/940/359/2018-940359545-111d36ae-9O.pdf [https://perma.cc/V2Q9-K3J8].
231. Id.
232. GuideStar’s search function allows easy access to compare and contrast charitable organizations of various sizes. Search, GUIDESTAR, https://www.guidestar.org/
search [https://perma.cc/H7LX-KRBG].
233. Clubs, KIWANIS INT’L, https://www.kiwanis.org/clubs [https://perma.cc/U5UF8RVU].
234. Rotary Int’l, Form 990: Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax, pt.
1, §§ 12, 18, at 1 (2018), https://pdf.guidestar.org/PDF_Images/2018/361/707/2018361707667-10766c95-9O.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Q4H-MPBU].
235. Id. pt. 1, §§ 10, 20, at 1.
236. Id. pt. III, § 1, at 2.
237. Rotary Found. of Rotary Int’l, Form 990: Return of Organization Exempt
from Income Tax, pt. 1, § 20, at 1 (2018), https://pdf.guidestar.org/PDF_Images/2018/
363/245/2018-363245072-10734d25-9.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VX4-BSAB].
238. Rotary Clubs, ROTARY INT’L, https://www.rotary.org/en/get-involved/rotaryclubs [https://perma.cc/7N5H-CPE5].
239. See Association of Poinciana Villages, ASS’N POINCIANA VILLAGES, https://
www.apvcommunity.com [https://perma.cc/HC6N-U5AG].
240. See Riverstone, RIVERSTONE DEV. CO., riverstone.com [https://perma.cc/
J9QE-S9WT].
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penses in the 2018 tax year.241 Riverstone took in about $7.8 million in
revenue and almost the same in expenses in the 2017 tax year.242
Riverstone asserts it promotes the health, safety, and welfare of its
residents.243 It hires a management company to maintain the neighborhood.244 From a review of data from Forms 990, there appear to be
a small number of homeowners’ associations that earn between $1 and
$3 million annually.245 But most social welfare organization homeowners’ associations are very small, like the $80,000 revenue a year
Deerfield Homeowners’ Association out of Fillmore, California.246
Many likely are too small to be required to file a tax return with the
IRS.
C. Tax Consequences of Forming as a Social Welfare Organization
A person forms a social welfare organization by incorporating a
nonprofit corporation under state law.247 He or she then files a Form
1024 with the IRS seeking recognition as exempt from taxation under
section 501(c)(4) of the Code.248 The newly formed organization can
then raise money through contributions, business operations (primarily activities that further its purpose), and loans.249 As long as it conducts business substantially related to its purpose, its income is
exempt from the federal income tax.250
A contributor to a social welfare organization may not deduct his or
her contribution as a charitable contribution under section 170 of the
241. Ass’n of Poinciana Villages Inc., Form 990: Return of Organization Exempt
from Income Tax, pt. 1, §§ 12, 19, at 1 (2018), https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/display_990/591514293/02_2020_prefixes_59-64%2F591514293_201812_990O_2020
021017132522 [https://perma.cc/HDT6-HJ68].
242. Riverstone Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., Form 990: Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax, pt. 1, §§ 12, 18, at 1 (2017), https://pdf.guidestar.org/
PDF_Images/2017/760/684/2017-760684372-0fffd669-9O.pdf [https://perma.cc/5MUAH6GD].
243. Id. pt. I, § 1, at 2.
244. Id. pt. VI, § A, at 6.
245. Based on Author’s own review of organizations on ProPublica that identified
as homeowners’ associations. See generally, Ken Schwencke et al., Nonprofit Explorer: Research Tax-Exempt Organizations, PROPUBLICA https://projects.propublica.
org/nonprofits/ (Nov. 19, 2020) [https://perma.cc/5S46-SU76] (providing the ProPublica database Author used in his review).
246. Deerfield Homeowner’s Ass’n, Form 990: Return of Organization Exempt
from Income Tax, pt. I, § 9, at 1 (2018), https://pdf.guidestar.org/PDF_Images/2018/
770/083/2018-770083789-10fad0ad-ZO.pdf [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/UV9W-G46H].
247. Nothing prohibits a social welfare organization from forming as a charitable
trust, like a charitable organization is permitted to do under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).
248. 26 U.S.C. § 506 (requiring social welfare organizations to file a notice with the
IRS “not later than [sixty] days after the organization is established”); Form 1024:
Application for Recognition of Exemption Under Section 501(a), 1 (2018), https://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1024.pdf [https://perma.cc/TG98-5EHA].
249. Form 1024: Application for Recognition of Exemption Under Section 501(a),
at 5 (2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1024.pdf [https://perma.cc/TG98-5EHA].
250. 26 U.S.C. §§ 501(c)(4), 511–514.
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Code. However, in addition to possibly deducting a transfer to a social
welfare organization under another section of the Code,251 contributors can obtain tax benefits from certain contributions. A contributor
who donates appreciated assets does not recognize the gain on the
contribution. For instance, assume Sarah owns stock she bought for
$100 that is now worth $1,000. Sarah can contribute that stock to a
social welfare organization and avoid recognition of the gain inherent
in that stock.252 This allows Sarah a deduction in effect. The social
welfare organization is carrying out $1,000 of activity Sarah supports
at a tax cost of only $100 worth of income to Sarah. Had she first sold
the stock and contributed the cash, she would have had to pay tax on
the $900 gain. By transferring the appreciated asset to a social welfare
organization, she avoids income tax on $900.
A social welfare organization might owe tax if it engages in an unrelated business,253 which is a business activity that does not substantially further the organization’s purpose of promoting social
welfare.254 Thus, a social welfare organization that runs a lawn mowing business on the side would most likely have to pay tax on that
activity. If that activity was too substantial, the organization would no
longer be considered exempt from income tax.
Additionally, since 2016, a contribution to a social welfare organization is no longer subject to the gift tax.255 Sarah can thus make unlimited gifts to a social welfare organization without needing to worry
about the gift tax.
The bottom line is that a person who chooses to further his or her
interests through a social welfare organization gains some tax benefits.
First, he or she can avoid both an income tax on gains on appreciated
assets and a gift tax on any contribution. Second, no tax is owed on
profits earned by the social welfare organization in any taxable year as
long as the profits are from a related trade or business.
IV. RATIONALES

FOR

TAX EXEMPTION

Congress provides for exemption from the federal corporate income tax for most nonprofit entities in the United States.256 While the
rationale for this exemption used to be unstudied, the matter has received increasing attention.257 Most of that work remains focused on
251. For instance, a contributor might be able to deduct a payment as a trade or
business expense under 26 U.S.C. § 162.
252. Cf. 26 U.S.C. § 84 (making the contribution of appreciated assets to a political
organization a realization event).
253. 26 U.S.C. § 511.
254. 26 U.S.C. § 513.
255. 26 U.S.C. § 2501(a)(6).
256. 26 U.S.C. § 501(a).
257. See Ellen P. Aprill, Regulating the Political Speech of Noncharitable Exempt
Organizations After Citizens United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 363, 365–66 (2011); Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501, 504–05 (1990)
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charitable organizations, but an increasing number of scholars also
consider other tax-exempt entities.258 The initial forays contended that
the exemption amounted to a quid pro quo in return for some collective service or good the government might have provided on its
own.259 Others argued it made no sense to count the gains of some
nonprofits, like charities, as income.260 Most theories instead assume
that the corporate income tax should apply to all corporations.261
[hereinafter Altruism in Nonprofit]; Rob Atkinson, Theories of the Federal Income
Tax Exemption for Charities: Thesis, Antithesis, and Syntheses, 27 STETSON L. REV.
395, 396 (1997); Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit
Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 301 (1976) [hereinafter Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations]; Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the Charity Tax Exemption, 23 J. CORP. L. 585, 585 (1998); Nina
J. Crimm, An Explanation of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charitable Organizations: A Theory of Risk Compensation, 50 FLA. L. REV. 419, 420 (1998); Miranda
Perry Fleischer, Libertarianism and the Charitable Tax Subsidies, 56 B.C. L. REV.
1345, 1345 (2015); Miranda Perry Fleischer, Charitable Giving and Utilitarianism:
Problems and Priorities, 89 IND. L.J. 1485, 1486 (2014); Miranda Perry Fleischer,
Equality of Opportunity and the Charitable Tax Subsidies, 91 B.U. L. REV. 601,
603–04 (2011); Miranda Perry Fleischer, Theorizing the Charitable Tax Subsidies: The
Role of Distributive Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 505, 507–08 (2010); Mark A. Hall &
John D. Colombo, The Charitable Status of Nonprofit Hospitals: Toward a Donative
Theory of Tax Exemption, 66 WASH. L. REV. 307, 313 (1991); Mark A. Hall & John
D. Colombo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable Tax Exemption, 52 OHIO ST. L.J.
1379, 1381–82 (1991); Daniel Halperin, Is Income Tax Exemption for Charities a Subsidy?, 64 TAX L. REV. 283, 283 (2011) [hereinafter Charities a Subsidy?]; Daniel
Halperin, Income Taxation of Mutual Nonprofits, 59 TAX L. REV. 133, 135 (2006)
[hereinafter Mutual Nonprofits]; Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting
Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 55 (1981)
[hereinafter The Rationale]; Daniel Jacob Hemel, Tangled Up in Tax: The Nonprofit
Sector and the Federal Tax System, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 1 (Walter W. Powell & Patricia Bromley eds., 3d ed. 2019); Lawrence M. Stone,
Federal Tax Support of Charities and Other Exempt Organizations: The Need for a
National Policy, 20 MAJOR TAX PLAN. 27, 27 (1968) [hereinafter Federal Tax Support]; Burton Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Nonprofit Sector in a
Three-Sector Economy, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS 37 (Susan
Rose-Ackerman ed., 1986) [hereinafter Theory of the Voluntary].
258. For example, a symposium recently considered the appropriateness of the exemption of social welfare organizations. 2017 New York University’s National Center
on Philanthropy and Law’s Conference, “Social Welfare Organizations: A Better Alternative to Charities?”.
259. See Federal Tax Support, supra note 257, at 45.
260. Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations, supra note 257, at 307–08, 315. Bittker
and Rahdert also argued: (1) a tax on charitable activity would unfairly apply the high
corporate tax rate to individual consumption that ought to be taxed at a lower rate;
and (2) it might just be administratively inconvenient to apply a tax to organizations
that do not amount to much of any economic activity. Id. All the same, they acknowledged many categories of exempt organizations, like business associations, generated
taxable income. Id.
261. The Rationale, supra note 257, at 55. There is also a long literature considering
who bears the incidence of the corporate income tax. It could be shareholders, labor,
consumers, or worldwide holders of capital. Jennifer Gravelle offers a rundown of
some of the theories. Jennifer Gravelle, Corporate Tax Incidence: Review of General
Equilibrium Estimates and Analysis, 66 NAT. TAX J. 185 (2013).
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Those theorists then view exemption as a subsidy equal to the annual
tax the nonprofit would have paid in tax without the exemption.262
There are two dominant rationales263: Henry Hansmann’s efficiency
rationale264 and Burton Weisbrod’s government-failure rationale.265
Both seem to assume that the results of a free market are the ideal
ends of a well-designed tax policy.266
Hansmann argues the government could subsidize those nonprofits
that provide goods and services that are not produced at an efficient
market level because of a market failure.267 For instance, there is a
classic case of market failure as a result of asymmetric information
when it comes to aiding the poor in a foreign country.268 The donors
who provide the aid cannot ensure its quality or its arrival.269 We can
thus expect less aid, and less quality aid, to arrive than is optimal.
Because there are no owners of a nonprofit, donors can have confidence in nonprofits to provide these goods and services.270 Still, the
lack of owners means it is harder to generate the necessary capital to
build the operation.271 With a governmental subsidy through tax exemption, we might approach a more efficient provision of these types
of goods and services. Hansmann is less sanguine about much of the
rest of the exempt sector such as social clubs because he is suspicious
that there is no efficiency problem that these organizations solve and
believes they can raise necessary capital.272
262. For instance, Halperin makes this assumption based on the belief that the income tax should be designed to properly measure income. Mutual Nonprofits, supra
note 257, at 135.
263. There are others, such as exemption for nonprofits, that might foster pluralism. See Taxing the Unheavenly, supra note 14, at 268, n.12 (discussing some of the
sources that make this argument).
264. The Rationale, supra note 257, at 72. See also Charities a Subsidy?, supra note
257, at 294–97 (adopting Hansmann’s contract failure analysis to examine charitable
organizations). There are a number of scholars who contest this efficiency rationale.
For instance, in Altruism in Nonprofit, Rob Atkinson argues that we subsidize charitable nonprofits to encourage altruism and to encourage redistribution of resources.
Altruism in Nonprofit, supra note 257, at 633–34. See also Daniel Shaviro, Assessing
the “Contract Failure” Explanation for Nonprofit Organizations and Their Tax-Exempt Status, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1001, 1006–07 (1997) (arguing that Hansmann’s
underinvestment hypothesis is likely wrong and that exempt organizations may also
over invest in domains such that a penalty could be called for instead of a subsidy;
though ultimately Shaviro argues for an efficiency rationale to support those organizations that provide some positive externality).
265. Theory of the Voluntary, supra note 257.
266. See The Rationale, supra note 257, at 72; Theory of the Voluntary, supra note
257.
267. The Rationale, supra note 257, at 54–55, 70.
268. Id. at 69–70.
269. Id. at 69.
270. Id. at 70 & n.57. Cf. Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit
Charities, 93 VA. L. REV. 2017, 2024 (2007).
271. The Rationale, supra note 257, at 72.
272. Id. at 94–95.
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Weisbrod argues that tax-exempt organizations provide an opportunity to solve a problem he calls “government market failure.”273 Because majorities rule in a democracy, there will always be some
substantial minority that is unable to accomplish its governmental
goals of providing certain collective goods.274 Tax-exempt entities provide a government-financed avenue for satisfying the public good
needs and wants of this minority.275
What have scholars said regarding social welfare organizations?
Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer argues that most social welfare organizations
probably are legitimately tax exempt because “the act of aggregating
funds for the purpose of pursuing a collective, non-business (i.e., not
for-profit) activity should not be subject to tax as long as any net income is either refunded to the persons supporting the activity (i.e.,
dues-paying members), or retained for future use that furthers the
nonprofit’s purposes.”276 The exemption from tax for investment income and capital expenditures cannot, however, be justified as a pooling of nontaxable activity. Mayer thus argues social welfare
organizations should pay tax on investment income. Overall, Mayer
finds exemption for social welfare organizations a useful solution for
those trying to conduct community-based activity in a tax-exempt
form that does not quite meet the section 501(c)(3) standard.277
Ellen Aprill argues there is practical reason to believe the section’s
broad nature serves an important purpose.278 It safeguards “the limits
of [section] 501(c)(3) and . . . defend[s] the integrity of [section]
501(c)(3),” by fulfilling a boundary protecting function.279 Its most important boundary-keeping role might be to keep the lobbying limitation on charitable organizations constitutional.280 While the IRS
admitted some organizations that were not quite charitable to the social-welfare fold, these acts arguably provided a signal to Congress
which eventually created new tax exempt categories for these organizations. In that sense it protected the boundary of charitable
organizations.
Roger Colinvaux sees the ability to use social welfare organizations
to intervene in campaigns and avoid campaign finance laws to be a
273. Theory of the Voluntary, supra note 257, at 22.
274. Id. at 30–31, 33.
275. Id. at 30.
276. A (Partial) Defense, supra note 128, at 469–70.
277. Id. at 447, 480.
278. Examining the Landscape, supra note 9, at 348 (citing John Simon, Harvey
Dale & Laura Chisolm, The Federal Tax Treatment of Charitable Organizations, in
THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 267, 284–92 (Walter W. Powell &
Richard Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2006) (arguing that charitable tax exemption plays a
border control function to ensure that neither the commercial nor the governmental
sector carries out charitable activity)).
279. Id. at 383.
280. Id. at 376.
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corrupting influence on the nonprofit sector as a whole.281 He thinks
this problematically leads to a sense that social welfare organizations
are tax shelters, when, to Colinvaux, they are disclosure shelters.282
He argues that the primary change needed within the social-welfare
sphere is clarity of the law particularly with respect to political activity
disclosure.283 Colinvaux acknowledges that the IRS is probably not
the best institution from which to require disclosure but thinks the
non-disclosure harm outweighs the institutional harm.284 He also argues that we ought to tax contributors on appreciated assets transferred to social welfare organizations.285
While the above scholarship explicitly focuses on the role of social
welfare organizations under federal income tax law, there is a broader
literature on nonprofits that can inform our consideration as well. Philosophers, sociologists, and historians look at the role of nonprofits
within a democratic capitalist system, too. Rob Reich, for example, in
Just Giving, frames the question of philanthropy as: “given the ubiquity and universality of philanthropy, what attitude should a state
have toward the preference of people to give money away for some
prosocial or public purpose?”286 As currently regulated, he believes
the vast money in the philanthropic sector, which surely includes social welfare organizations, has become a plutocratic force. The amount
of money from wealthy interests going into philanthropy is turning us
into an oligarchy, and away from a liberal democracy, because wealth
is determining our social solutions for us. He argues we need a political theory of philanthropy.287
Historian Jonathan Levy contends that nonprofits today work to
“pass through” wealth, power, and rights to wealthy individuals rather

281. Plague of Inconsistency, supra note 201, at 495.
282. Id. at 498; see also Criminal Complaint at 15 ¶ 45, United States v. Borges, No.
1:20-MJ-00526 (D. Ohio July 17, 2020). This criminal complaint was filed for an enormous bribery scheme against Larry Householder, the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the state of Ohio, along with a connected social welfare organization. Id.
One quote in the complaint is particularly telling: “Clark discussed with Householder,
the use of a 501(c)(4), controlled by Householder, to receive payments: ‘what’s interesting is that there’s a newer solution that didn’t occur in, 13 years ago, is that they
can give as much or more to the (c)(4) and nobody would ever know. So you don’t
have to be afraid of anyone because there’s a mechanism to change it.’ ” Id..
283. Plague of Inconsistency, supra note 201, at 501–02.
284. Id. (citing Lloyd H. Mayer, The Much Maligned 527 and Institutional Choice,
87 B.U. L. REV. 625, 682 (2007) (arguing that the FEC rather than the IRS should be
the institutional choice for monitoring disclosure)).
285. Id. at 503 (citing Gregg D. Polsky & Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Regulating Section
527 Organizations, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1000, 1013–14 n.81 (2005) (arguing that
this rule ought to apply to all exempt organizations except charitable ones)).
286. ROB REICH, JUST GIVING: WHY PHILANTHROPY IS FAILING DEMOCRACY AND
HOW IT CAN DO BETTER 195 (2018).
287. Id. at 15.
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than carry out publicly minded missions.288 Aaron Horvath and Walter W. Powell are concerned about what they term disruptive philanthropy: “[I]nitiatives, we contend, crowd out the public sector, further
reducing both its legitimacy and its efficacy, and replace civic goals
with narrower concerns about efficiency and markets.”289 As some tax
scholars believe the potential for wealthy interests to make problematic tax use of social welfare organizations at a greater level than a
charitable organization,290 these are concerns we should have with the
social welfare sector as well.
V. ANALYSIS
This Part primarily evaluates the income tax regime applicable to
social welfare organizations from the perspective of political justice as
described in Part II. Thus, the primary question is whether tax exemption for social welfare organizations is just because it does not harm
equal political voice and perhaps enhances it. There are two primary
issues here. First, what is the relationship between social welfare organization tax exemption and PVE? Second, what is the role of social
welfare organizations in ensuring some of the essential rights to a
democratic order identified in Part I.B, such as the freedom of speech,
association, and free and fair elections?
I first consider social welfare organizations as a part of our democratic order. I then consider whether the tax treatment of social welfare organizations amounts to a subsidy. Next, I apply a political
justice critique to social welfare organizations by examining three
types of specific social welfare activity/organization, which I mentioned above in Part II.B: advocacy, health services/insurance, community clubs/homeowners’ associations. I also evaluate these
questions in light of Hansmann’s contract failure theory and Weisbrod’s government failure theory. I consider broader implications of
this analysis such as its impact on the rest of the sector, specifically
asking what this analysis may imply for the charitable sector. Finally, I
suggest some implications of this political justice analysis for the rest
of the Code.

288. Jonathan Levy, From Fiscal Triangle to Passing Through: Rise of the Nonprofit
Corporation, in CORPORATIONS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 217 (Naomi R. Lamoreaux & William J. Novak eds., 2017).
289. Aaron Horvath & Walter W. Powell, Contributory or Disruptive: Do New
Forms of Philanthropy Erode Democracy?, in PHILANTHROPY IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES 89 (Rob Reich, Chiara Cordelli & Lucy Bernholz eds., 2016).
290. David S. Miller, Social Welfare Organizations as Grantmakers, 21 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 413, 437 (2018).
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A. Social Welfare Organizations as a Part of Civil Society
A vibrant civil society is a long-acknowledged, important part of a
just political system.291 As discussed in the Introduction and in Part II,
civil society consists of associations and institutions that facilitate the
formation of public opinions in spaces located outside of the for-profit
or governmental sectors.292 Much of the nonprofit, tax-exempt sector
including many within the social welfare organization sector likely fit
within this definition of civil society. A deliberative democratic theorist might question whether some of the organizations that qualify as
social welfare organizations legitimately fit into civil society. For instance, large business operations such as HMOs or big-businessbacked advocacy organizations appear to be a part of the economic
order instead of a sector separate from for-profit and governmental
sectors and thus would fall outside of civil society. Nevertheless, in
understanding how to design tax policy for social welfare organizations in a politically just way, we should consider the role they play in
civil society. While the democratic traditions discussed in Part II.B all
find a strong civil society an important part of a democratic order,
they each have different takes on what role these organizations ought
to play in a politically just order.
For somewhat different reasons, each democratic tradition finds
that freedom of association, speech, information, and free and fair
elections are critical to a well working and just order. Some definitions
of civil society include these freedoms.293 This makes sense as civic
associations often play a role in protecting these freedoms. Thus, the
formation of these organizations is in itself important to a democratic
order.
As discussed in Part I.B, republican theorists view civil society with
mixed feelings. In part, they fear civil-society associations because
they express selfish interests that conflict with the general will of the
state.294 Nevertheless, the republican theorist thinks civil society is
291. THEDA SKOCPOL, DIMINISHED DEMOCRACY 20–24 (2003) (discussing how
civic associations in the United States served and continue to serve as schools of democracy and of solidarity for the political order) [hereinafter DIMINISHED
DEMOCRACY].
292. Three Normative Models, supra note 13, at 8; BETWEEN FACTS, supra note 58,
at 298–99.
293. See Protecting and Expanding Civic Space, UNITED NATIONS OFF. OF THE
HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/CivicSpace/Pages/
[https://perma.cc/TJ6A-XR3C].
294. See, e.g., DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 35, at 289 (“All political
societies are composed of other, smaller societies of different types, each of which has
its interests and maxims . . . . The will of these particular societies always has two
relations: for the members of the association, it is a general will; for the large society,
it is a private will, which is very often found to be upright in the first respect and
vicious in the latter” (quoting JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, WITH GENEVA MANUSCRIPT AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 212–13 (Roger D.
Masters ed., Judith R. Masters trans., 1978))).
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critical to a just order. James Madison warned of factions, but found
that government should not prohibit factions; it should hinder factions
through political structure instead.295 Alexis de Tocqueville thought
civil society was the lifeblood of democracy.296 Some modern republican theorists argue non-domination by the state is an important principle and see civil society as a bulwark to protect the individual from
arbitrary intervention by the state.297
Within the liberal order, civil society serves a fundamental role in
protecting freedom of speech and association, and two primary functions. First, politics is a battle between interests that fight for the right
of their idea to be ascendant.298 Associations bring important information to the government in that battle and the government referees that
fight. Second, civic life is a place for individuals to take care of themselves through voluntary action.299 If a nonprofit is the best provider
of a service, the state ought not stand in the way of that effort.
As discussed in Part II.B, the deliberative democratic theorist argues civil society’s most important role is to energetically keep open
the communication structures of a broad public sphere.300 In effect,
the goal of associations of civil society ought to be improving the quality, quantity, and diversity of deliberation in the public sphere. This is
a different role than that conceived of by either the liberal or republican traditions, though it may be closer to republican because of its
efforts to find a common will. Habermas developed his theory in part
in fear of the consequences of a republican tradition that prioritized
the state, which he believed led to problematic “totalitarian societies
of bureaucratic socialism.”301 Modern republican theorists who see
civil society as a bulwark against the state seem to agree with this
concern and analysis of deliberative democratic theory.302
Thus, there is broad agreement that political justice as democracy
includes freedom to form and operate associations like social welfare
organizations and just about any nonprofit entity. With that said, at
least within the deliberative democratic tradition, it is not clear that
the health sector as a major business would fit into this role, nor the
advocacy organizations for big business. The theorists of the different
traditions also believe in the fundamental equality of each person and
295. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 48 (James Madison) (Yale Univ. Press ed., 2009).
296. ALEXIS DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 490 (Henry C. Mansfield
& Delba Winthrop eds., 2000).
297. FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT, supra note 74, at 148.
298. See supra Part II.B.
299. See supra Part II.B.
300. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 58, at 369.
301. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 58, at 369.
302. See, e.g., FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT, supra note 74, at 147–48; see also
supra Part II.B (arguing civil society is a bulwark to protect individuals from arbitrary
actions of the state).
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his or her right to PVE.303 Part of our political justice analysis must,
therefore, be to determine what role tax exemption plays in ensuring a
freedom to form these associations. Critically though, as discussed in
Part II, there is a recognition that unequal resources for these groups
can lead to unequal voice before the legislature.
B. Is Tax Exemption for Social Welfare Organizations a Subsidy?
As a matter of income tax, should transfers of value in and out of a
social welfare organization be subject to tax? Transfers of things of
value in and out of a typical partnership and corporation are generally
subject to taxation.304 Accordingly, we know these entities are thought
to conduct business that gives rise to taxable income. Conversely, we
tend to think transfers of things of value in and out of charitable organizations, like a soup kitchen, ought not be subject to taxation. This
question regarding whether transfers of value in and out of a social
welfare organization matters because if there is no reason to tax the
income in the first place, then we need not justify exempting the income from tax because there is no income to tax. In this part, I argue
that outside a context I refer to as pooling associated with small organizations, we should consider exemption from income tax a subsidy
for social welfare organizations.
There are a few primary points where a social welfare organization
might generate income that could be subject to tax: (1) member contributions, (2) business activity, and (3) investment income.
Member contributions generally include payments like dues to a
nonprofit corporation from a member of a homeowner’s association,
service club, or kids’ recreational group.305 It would also include payments to advocacy organizations for the purpose of supporting a particular electoral or lobbying cause.306 Should these contributions be
treated as payment for services that ought to trigger income at the
corporate level? Business activity includes such things as payments for
medical insurance coverage at an HMO or the revenue that a skating
rink or a horse racing track generates in operating that business. For
tax purposes, that business activity can be considered related or unrelated to the social welfare purpose. An unrelated business activity is
already considered taxable by law.307 Finally, by investment income I
mean the income generated in a taxable year from the portfolio of
investments held by the organization. This income is generally not
303. See supra Part II.A.
304. Still, some partner contributions to the organization in return for their partner
share are generally not taxed. 26 U.S.C. § 721. Also, some shareholder contributions
to a corporation are not taxed. 26 U.S.C. § 351(a)–(d).
305. See 26 U.S.C. § 527(c)(3).
306. Some of this is consistent with “exempt function income” as described in 26
U.S.C. § 527(c)(3).
307. 26 U.S.C. § 511(a)(1).
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taxed because it is not considered unrelated business taxable
income.308
Tax law generally views a corporation as a separate person, distinct
from its contributors.309 Thus, transfers in and out of a corporation,
including one that is nonprofit, are thought to be taxable. Nevertheless, many argue that a lot of nonprofits, including those in the social
welfare category, are simply engaged in the pooling of resources on
behalf of individuals to accomplish something each individual could
have accomplished on his or her own.310
For example, assume Bob, Sue, and Betty decide to build a swimming pool together. Assume a year ago they each paid to build a pool.
Now they keep an account from which they pay annual costs. Each
pays $1,000 during the year to properly maintain the pool. The maintenance includes paying someone to regularly clean the pool and ensure it is ready for use. Total actual costs of running the pool in the
year, including depreciation, amount to $2,700 ($900 per person). It is
possible that we could think of the pool activity as a legal entity. If we
did, we might say that entity earned $300 in income and ought to pay a
corporate tax on $300 of income. But the tax law generally does not
work in this way in such an endeavor. In effect, the tax law would
treat the parties as if this activity was in their individual capacity.311
Bob could have paid to build and maintain a pool on his own—that he
happens to enter into this activity with two other people should not
generally change this result. Likewise, many argue that it is reasonable
to think of the activity of some nonprofits, like social welfare organizations, to be the same type of pooling activity.312
If we accept this characterization, there is no subsidy to the organization because there is no accession to wealth that should be taxed.
Those who argue this are likely arguing that contributions like member dues should not generate taxable income. Any surplus at the end
of the year is simply an account that is maintained in common for the
convenience of all members. Members are doing nothing other than
buying services or goods in common and keeping track of that through
a corporate entity. Thus, when a member of Kiwanis pays monthly
dues to pay for a facility and a weekly lunch, there should not be an
additional recognition of gain at the corporate level. Each member
just bought lunch and space with some other people. It is no different
than Bob, Sue, and Betty’s pool operation.
308. Id.
309. Moline Props., Inc. v. Comm’r, 319 U.S. 436, 438–39 (1943).
310. See, e.g., A (Partial) Defense, supra note 128, at 469–70 (citing Exemption of
Nonprofit Organizations, supra note 257, at 348–49); supra Part III (discussing this
argument).
311. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. 301.7701-1(a)(2) (as amended in 2011) (discussing when a
joint undertaking becomes a separate entity for tax purposes).
312. See Altruism in Nonprofit, supra note 257, at 570.
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Not all social welfare organizations can be described as only pooling
resources—HMOs do not fit this model for one. However, for those
social welfare organizations with small operations, it seems relatively
unobjectionable to approach the matter in this way. But, once an organization reaches some size, this claim ought to have less power because it becomes unrealistic. There is a vast difference between a
couple hundred friends spending less than $500,000 over the year to
meet weekly for lunch, and a multi-million dollar business providing
conference services for people around the country. There is a significant economy-of-scale difference of the value flowing in the two different operations. This could suggest that individual Kiwanis clubs
with revenue under $500,000 on an annual basis, or a similar kids’
sports recreation league, have no income to impose a tax upon. There
is no subsidy in these situations because they should not pay tax upon
such pooling activity.
However, justifying nontaxation on pooling grounds does not explain the tax-exempt treatment of business or investment income,
which would be taxable in the normal income tax. For example, a
Kiwanis club that ran a bookstore or invested in the stock market to
support its operations would not just be pooling resources in a nontaxable way. The pooling theory also cannot explain the nontaxation of
contributions of appreciated property.313
Still, there is another difficulty to the primary question of whether
there is a subsidy to social welfare organizations. If our purpose for
applying the income tax is to adjust individual taxable burdens based
on ability to pay, applying a tax to a corporate entity obscures our
view of whether we are accomplishing this goal.314 Realistically, if we
do not tax individuals currently on the income of a corporate entity,
we provide an opportunity for individuals to defer income tax in corporate solution, which generates tax benefits. Thus, the corporate tax
prevents the lowering of a tax burden by deferring tax in a nontaxable
corporate entity.315
Income is defined as an accession to wealth, clearly realized, over
which the taxpayer has complete dominion.316 This accords in part
with the Haig Simons definition of income that provides the base of
our U.S. concept of income.317 If the only question is whether a partic313. See A (Partial) Defense, supra note 128, at 471.
314. Philip T. Hackney, What We Talk About When We Talk About Tax Exemption, 33 VA. TAX REV. 115, 118 (2013) [hereinafter Talk About Tax Exemption] (arguing that all mutual benefit organizations should be presumed to be taxable unless
there is a strong policy reason for subsidizing the activity).
315. Notably, after Congress lowered the corporate income tax to 21% in the 2017
Tax Act, there is an opportunity to seek lower tax overall through this deferral mechanism. 26 U.S.C. § 11.
316. Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 477 (1955).
317. Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, Defining Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV.
295, 306 (2011).
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ular corporation as a taxpayer has an accession to wealth, that is
clearly realized over which it has dominion, a nonprofit corporation
would generate income that should be taxed to the extent it is not a
gift or a gain excluded from income.
However, if the question is whether a shareholder experienced
those gains, we can only see that through a diffuse filter. This problem
is the same whether the entity is for-profit or nonprofit. Someone benefits from the economic activity of a corporation, even if we do not
know who. In the for-profit case, a shareholder has a real relationship
to the corporate gains. We view pass-through entities such as partnerships in this way, too. Whether the partner receives money or not, we
allocate the gain for tax purposes to the partner.318 Similarly, in the
case of a grantor trust, whether the grantor receives money or not, we
allocate the income of the trust to the grantor.319
With a nonprofit organization we do not consider the controlling
individuals to have income because they have no accession to wealth,
no clearly realized income, and no dominion over that wealth. Thus, if
our vision was purely of a shareholder theory of the corporate income
tax, we would likely never tax nonprofit organization income.320
I have argued that we should assume that nonprofits controlled by
members to benefit members (mutual benefits) should be considered
to accumulate taxable income on behalf of their members.321 In the
case of a public benefit organization, such as charitable organizations,
this presumption should generally not hold. If operated properly, the
benefits from the operation of the charity are largely public in nature.
There are no shareholder-like individuals who we might say the tax is
there to impose a burden upon.322 To the extent the activity truly
helps the poor, we might even think that the corporate rate of 21% is
inappropriate to apply to such individuals who likely owe at a 0%
rate. There may still be reasons to tax the entity, such as to regulate
the activity by imposing a tax to limit the power of those who control
the entity, or tax the entity because that’s where money is, but the
shareholder theory would not explain the reason for taxing the
charity.
Where do social welfare organizations fit in this order? While there
is great commonality among the organizations that fit into the mutual
benefits, there is little commonality within the group that makes up
social welfare organizations.323 The sector cannot be thought to fit
into either the mutual benefit or the public benefit category.
318. 26 U.S.C. § 704(c)(1)(B)(ii).
319. 26 U.S.C. § 671.
320. Talk About Tax Exemption, supra note 314, at 150.
321. Id. at 151–54.
322. Andrews, supra note 17, at 314–15 (arguing that gains incurred for collective
purposes, such as in a charitable organization, ought not be taxed).
323. FROM CAMPS TO CAMPAIGN FUNDS, supra note 9, at 128.
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The activity of social welfare organizations is almost by definition
more private than that of charitable organizations. Social welfare organizations possess a lesser status than do charitable organizations.
Most prominently, Congress grants a charitable contribution deduction to an individual who makes a donation to a charitable organization but not to those who make a donation to a social welfare
organization.324 Additionally, there are more restrictions on charity by
statute, such as limitations on political and lobbying activity, than
there are on social welfare organizations. As discussed above in Part
III, the law contains little to guide a social welfare organization in how
to qualify. The charitable organization statute, though vague, came
with a set body of common law of charitable trusts to give immediate
content to a relatively vague statute.325 With social welfare, there was
no law from which we could draw the rules of what fits within that
purpose.
One additional complexity is that we generally do not tax political
organizations on their income, aside from investment income.326 I
raise this because the advocacy organizations at least could be thought
to fit into this tax-exempt category. Historically, the IRS did not apply
tax to political organizations.327 Congress codified this practice in section 527 in 1974.328 There is no deduction for contributors to political
campaigns,329 and we require the payment of the income tax on a
transfer of appreciated property to a political organization.330 Normatively, we might choose not to tax this activity because it does look
like the pooling of income. But, maybe more importantly, it might be
troubling to imply political campaigns are run for transactional purposes. Finally, we may also not want to hinder political activity.
In summary, outside a relatively narrow pooling context, there is a
good claim that exemption from income tax in the case of a social
welfare organization ought to be thought of as a subsidy. There are
some complicating factors to that case. However, given the more selfish nature of social welfare organizations than charitable organizations, and that in many instances substantial businesses are operated
within this sector, we ought to come up with a sufficient justification
for this exemption.
324. 26 U.S.C. § 170.
325. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 598 (1983).
326. 26 U.S.C. § 527(b)–(c). The unrelated business income tax under 26 U.S.C.
§ 511 does not apply to political organizations.
327. I.R.S., IRC 527 - Political Organizations (1989), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irstege/eotopici89.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8PG-VKKU]; see Rev. Proc. 68-19, 1968-1 C.B.
810 (holding that political funds were not taxable income to the candidate involved);
see also I.R.S. Announcement 73-84, 1973-2 C.B. 461 (1973).
328. Pub. L. 93–625, § 10(a), Jan. 3, 1975, 88 Stat. 2116.
329. 26 U.S.C. § 162(e)(1)(B).
330. 26 U.S.C. § 84.
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C. What Does Democratic Political Justice Say About Providing a
Subsidy to Social Welfare Organizations?
In this Section, I first consider the implications for tax purposes
from the conclusion of Part V.A that civic associations, like social welfare organizations, ought not be hindered by the state because our
democratic traditions consider them an important part of civil society.
This raises two broad questions: (1) is this policy right as to advocacy
organizations, and (2) is this policy right as to organizations that provide other goods and services such as HMOs and other member-based
structures? I will try to answer these two questions in the sections that
follow. In this Section, I consider whether it is possible that the principle of non-hindrance demands that the state not tax these
organizations.331
Perhaps the income tax could be viewed as a penalty that hinders
nonprofit organizations from forming and operating. I suggested a
similar argument above in Part V.B as to political organizations.
Before examining that question, though, it is necessary to establish
some of the fundamental reasons for employing as close to a comprehensive, global, and uniform tax system as we can.332 By a comprehensive system, I mean one like the Haig-Simons definition that as to an
individual includes their consumption plus change in wealth during
the time period.333 By global, I mean one that treats all income the
same no matter the source.334 By uniform, I mean a tax system that
applies the same rules to all income.335
From an administrability perspective, it makes sense to extend the
income tax to all arenas of life transactions in order to prevent gaming
of the system.336 In other words, if there is individual consumption or
accretion to wealth occurring, even if in a charitable or social welfare
organization, it ought to be taxed. Additionally, because the same tax
applies no matter the activity, there should be no impact on market
efficiency. Finally, some find this system equitable because everyone’s
ability to pay is measured with the same measuring stick.337
331. See, e.g., DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 35, at 170 (“In large democratic systems the right to form political parties and other political associations is necessary to voting equality, effective participation, enlightenment, and final control over
the agenda.”).
332. See, e.g., Uniform Taxation, supra note 1, at 49–52 (defining the terms comprehensive, global versus schedular, and uniform versus source treatment in an income
tax system).
333. Id. at 46.
334. Id. at 49.
335. Id. at 51.
336. An obvious limit to such a claim is that taxing every entity may improperly
wind up applying the same tax twice to a lot of different transactions.
337. Many contest that this ideal makes any sense at all. See Uniform Taxation,
supra note 1, at 46–49 (discussing some of the literature on this debate).
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Realistically though, this idea is not achievable because a legislative
body will exempt some activities. In our income tax system, for instance, though we could arguably tax a gift, Congress exempts such
income from our tax system.338 Still, those exemptions should need to
clear a high bar. The person who argues that a tax is a hindrance to
the formation of a civil society organization as a rationale for exempting these organizations from income tax probably ought to bear the
burden of proof. Exemption has real consequences to the functioning
of the tax system including its efficiency, equity, and administrability.
Why might someone with political justice in mind argue that an organization of civil society ought not be taxed because these organizations should not be hindered by the state?
A traditional republican theorist would likely have no problem with
the taxation of civil society groups. Such groups have a selfish will
opposed to the general will of the state.339 However, a modern republican theorist, as discussed above in Part II.B, who believes in nondomination, might contend it is important to allow some autonomous
organizations outside the state to operate free from taxation. The theorist might argue that there are some cleavages, like religious ones,
that are salient enough and the interest important enough that some
associations ought to be able to pour their money into their endeavors
without taxation.340 For instance, a religious organization might argue
that as a religious association it ought to have substantial separation
from the state.341 To tax the religious association would be to hinder
an important part of civil society. Our treatment today of churches as
to their relationship to the IRS likely derives from such a political
justice notion. If the IRS wants to audit a church, it must go through
extraordinary procedures,342 and a church need not file an application
for exemption343 nor a tax return with the IRS.344
Weisbrod arguably makes a liberal case for non-hindrance in his
government-failure theory.345 As discussed above in Part IV, he assumes the government provides collective market goods desired
mostly by the median voter. Tax exemption then allows minority voters to provide collective goods to cater to their interests.346 Though
Weisbrod suggests we might subsidize this activity to get the efficient
338. 26 U.S.C. § 102.
339. See, e.g., DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 35, at 289 (quoting ROUSSEAU, supra note 294, at 212–13).
340. This could be seen in a sense as a light version of a consociational democratic
order. See DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 35, at 256–58 (describing
consociationalism).
341. Evelyn Brody argued we provide exemption to charitable organizations based
on a sovereignty theory. Of Sovereignty and Subsidy, supra note 257, at 588.
342. 26 U.S.C. § 7611.
343. 26 U.S.C. § 508(c)(1)(A).
344. 26 U.S.C. § 6033(a)(3).
345. See infra Part III (citing Theory of the Voluntary, supra note 257, at 22).
346. See generally Theory of the Voluntary, supra note 257.
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provision of the good, the liberal theorist might argue that we should
not hinder this particular market activity. It is also consistent with the
idea that we ought to let individuals voluntarily provide goods and
services to themselves as much as possible.
It is hard to know what a deliberative-democratic theorist might argue. Civil society is supposed to be separate and independent from
both the state and the economic forces of society. At the same time,
there is a need to work to bring forth everyone’s voice in an equal
manner. Non-hindrance through exempting these organizations from
tax might therefore appear to make some sense to strengthen that sector. However, my expectation is that the value of PVE would override
this notion.
What are the problems from a political justice standpoint of this
application of a non-hindrance principle? If there is income in the civil
society organization in its Haig-Simon sense, the nontaxation is actual
support. For instance, the failure to tax investment income would be
to provide economic support to such activity to the extent of the tax
rate times the income. In this sense, the political justice of this rationale is problematic. Why?
First, because of the vague social welfare standard, this policy is arbitrary. The subsidy flows from a market mechanism in that the government benefit flows in greater quantity to those individuals who
happen to have resources and a particularly economically successful
good or service. Those without the necessary resources or a less economically successful social welfare good or service will get little to no
help from the state. Second, to the extent the activity is in the nature
of an interest group, the unequal provision of a subsidy to organizations based on their success in the market should offend the need for
equality to all individuals in political voice. Fundamentally, non-hindrance by not taxing is support of some to the exclusion of other
interests.
If I am right, that democratic traditions would value PVE the most,
then the democratic traditions would support only a narrow vision of
non-hindrance. If that is so, then the social welfare standard is far too
vague and broad to pass the requirements of political justice. The recognition of our shared endeavor as part of the state and the necessary
belief in equality of citizens would build a strong presumption against
such a provision.
D. Advocacy Organizations
By advocacy organizations, I mean those that lobby, are considered
to intervene in a political campaign, and those that broadly advocate
for a cause through education or legal processes. What does a political
justice analysis suggest regarding the tax treatment associated with the
advocacy organizations of the social welfare sector? For ease of analysis, in this section I look at the three specific advocacy organizations I
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describe above in Part III.B. that give a sense of the scope of the types
of advocacy organizations in the sector.
Based on social science research on collective action, tax exemption
provides a subsidy in both an inefficient manner and a politically unjust way to tax exempt business leagues and labor unions.347 Rather
than enhancing PVE, this system exacerbates the democratically problematic inequality of resources.348 Congress provides a subsidy to
groups with an already strong political voice, and little to none to
those with little political voice. We could enhance efficiency and political justice to end the exemption for both.349 However, given the weak
political voice of labor and the generally strong political voice of business, we could enhance efficiency and political justice by ending the
business interest exemption while maintaining the exemption for labor unions.350
Does subsidizing advocacy organization activity through the income
tax increase the number of people able to express their will to the
government? In the case of clear partisan organizations typified by
Crossroads GPS, described above in Part III.B, the only thing exemption does is amplify the voice of the politically strong.351 A democratic
political-justice theory thus would find against the provision of the
subsidy to groups like Crossroads GPS supported by very wealthy interests through tax exemption. Its design violates PVE. That should be
the case even in the instance of the liberal democratic theorist that
supports a market model, because of the harm to PVE. Though the
liberal theorist believes in market forces, he or she also believe in political voice neutrality. There are likely some social welfare organizations that advance interests that experience tremendous collective
action challenges. Nevertheless, because the system is predominately
accessible by those advocacy organizations that do not face these challenges, elimination of the subsidy seems like the only way to make the
system more neutral as a PVE matter.
What about more broadly defined rights organizations like the
NRA and ACLU? The NRA and ACLU broadly promote the interests of a large segment of society.352 They both tend to align with either the Democratic or Republican party, but they also provide
information on, and defend the rights of, citizens on matters of civil
liberty. Some may strongly disagree with the right to guns as defended
by the NRA, but at least on its face under any of the three traditions it
is a matter that citizens might discuss and agree or disagree upon as a
347. Taxing the Unheavenly, supra note 14, at 269; Prop Up the Heavenly, supra
note 7, at 320.
348. Jordan Brennan, United States Income Inequality: The Concept of Countervailing Power Revisited, 39 J. POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 72, 72–73 (2016).
349. Prop Up the Heavenly, supra note 7, at 368.
350. Id.
351. See supra Part II.B.
352. See supra Part II.
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fundamental right. The rights the ACLU defends represent core liberal rights, discussed above in Part II.B, that make a real part of each
democratic tradition.
These organizations are both, in their own ways, trying to defend
what citizens perceive to be civil liberties here in the United States.
Do these organizations as fashioned increase the PVE or defend liberal rights? Or, like the partisan organization analysis, do they perhaps drown out those who would otherwise speak?
The ACLU directly protects civil liberties that are specifically critical to PVE, such as freedom of speech and association.353 It is doubtful there could be a more deserving organization on this front. The
republican, liberal, and deliberative democracy theorist would find
this organization worthy.
The NRA is more complex. The protection of gun rights does not
seem to go to typical civil liberties that might enhance PVE or basic
civil rights. As we saw in the contract-failure and government-failure
theories, the NRA is more mixed in its goals: protecting the interests
of the business of making and selling guns; but also protecting gun
owner rights and educating about the use of guns. On the one hand,
the first interest describes an organization in the nature of a business
league that I have previously argued does not deserve exemption.354
On the other hand, the right to bear arms could be something we collectively agree ought to be supported. Arguably, the founders made
such a conclusion in the Second Amendment to the Constitution.
It might be useful to consider the application of Hansmann’s contract-failure theory. We might find that the market was already providing gun education without subsidy. Furthermore, gun
manufacturers and distributors have a strong interest in advocating for
the rights of gun owners. Under contract failure, then, we might say
that such an activity should not qualify because there is no contract
failure. By providing a subsidy, we make the market inefficient.
With respect to the ACLU, however, it is unlikely the market would
provide these services. Lawyers provide these services to clients with
means, but it is unlikely the lawyers would generate enough private
clients to provide the services of the ACLU. Thus, the ACLU would
be the type of organization that should be granted the status of exemption to benefit from a subsidy under contract failure.
How about partisan organizations, such as Crossroads GPS? If we
think of these organizations as providing the service of advocating for
a cause, there is no market inefficiency. Plenty of for-profit companies
are willing to offer such services.355 If we abstract out to the rights
353. Am. Civil Liberties Union, Form 990: Return of Organization Exempt From
Income Tax, supra note 216, pt. 1, § 1, at 1.
354. Taxing the Unheavenly, supra note 14.
355. See Nadra Nittle, Nike, Dick’s Sporting Goods, and Other Brands Got Political
in 2018, VOX (Dec. 17, 2018, 7:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/the-goods/2018/12/17/
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represented instead, perhaps there is a contract failure involved.
Those groups advocating for establishment candidates and causes
likely face little collective-action challenges, while non-established
candidates and causes may face enormous challenges. As I discussed
in Taxing the Unheavenly Chorus, certain groups likely face few challenges in organizing.356 Wealthy interests, for instance, will face little
difficulty organizing themselves.357 Because it is likely that the same
wealthy and small groups are the ones taking advantage of the social
welfare exemption, contract failure would likely find against the exemption of these organizations. The question we are left with is
whether we could design an exemption system targeted only to those
that face great collective action challenges. I do not believe we
could.358
What about government failure? Can we justify exemption to advocacy social welfare organizations because these organizations provide
collective services desired by a minority? This idea does not fit perfectly because advocacy organizations, like Crossroads GPS, do not
primarily provide what we traditionally think of as end goods or services.359 They are instead seeking such end goods and services from
the government. Maybe we could envision advocacy organizations as
providers of information to the state. But, the unequal provision of
the subsidy to those who need it least under efficiency or political justice would seem to outweigh any value associated with this provision.
The government-failure idea has more promise in services provided
by organizations like the ACLU and the NRA. The ACLU provides a
service by representing people in court to protect their civil liberties.
The NRA provides gun safety education and protects rights of gun
owners.360 Thus, again maybe we find some support for some narrow
areas of advocacy organizations that protect civil rights at an individual level.
Where does this leave us on tax exemption? If we are to grant tax
exemption to advocacy organizations, it should be highly conscripted
to only those that are clearly providing protections to civil liberties,
like the ACLU. The case for the ACLU seems particularly strong
under the political-justice analysis. Congress could amend section
501(c)(4) to clarify that the only advocacy type organizations permitted are those actively protecting the civil liberties of the people in the
1839699/companies-nike-patagonia-dicks-politics-kaepernik-trump-ads [https://
perma.cc/P6TL-KWPT].
356. Taxing the Unheavenly, supra note 14, at 274.
357. Id.
358. Perhaps that we exempt labor unions suggests we could come up with other
similar categories that face significant collective-action challenges.
359. Crossroads Grassroots Pol’y Strategies, Form 990: Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax, supra note 217, pt. 3, § 1, at 2.
360. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Form 990: Return of Organization Exempt From
Income Tax, supra note 213, pt. 1, § 1, at 1.
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United States. Congress would need to tightly define the meaning of
civil liberties.
However, this might be a difficult political line to hold. Partisan
groups would likely protest being left out while groups like the ACLU
were permitted to maintain exemption. It also could likely be challenged on First Amendment grounds for discriminating on the basis of
the content of speech. For these reasons, I would broadly recommend
ending tax exemption for all advocacy-related organizations. It would
therefore probably be strategically better to simply end exemption for
these organizations. The value of eliminating exemption altogether for
these groups is probably greater than the modest loss of incentives to
civil liberty protecting organizations.
Alternatively, where does taxing advocacy-related social welfare organizations leave us? It would mean we would treat the activity as a
business. The NRA, for instance, as a corporation, would be taxed on
selling its services to its members and pay tax on its investment income at corporate rates. A group could choose to operate as a passthrough entity and get the tax attributes of such a situation. But again, it
would pay tax as if it conducted a business like any other organization.
Finally, if advocacy-related social welfare organizations were simply
taxable corporations, there would be potential regulatory problems.
We might lose publicly disclosed information about these organizations in the annual tax returns they file.361 Some might be pushed into
the legal regime of political organizations under section 527. The more
troubling possibility is that some might try migrating to charitable status under section 501(c)(3). The IRS would need to be vigilant in
guarding the lines to that status. Many charitable organizations form
advocacy organizations to get around the limitations on lobbying and
political campaign intervention.362 Arguably, the ability of charitable
organizations to operate a social welfare organization to speak politically has made those limitations on speech constitutional.363 As Ellen
Aprill argued, we might also lose some of the boundary protecting
function that these organizations arguably serve.364 This presents a
significant practical problem to this analysis, but I do not think it
changes the fact that the operation of the system is politically unjust.
361. Social welfare organizations currently file Form 990 and that form is publicly
disclosable. It allows the public to generate information about these organizations.
Public Inspection and Disclosure of Form 990-T, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/charitiesnon-profits/charitable-organizations/public-inspection-and-disclosure-of-form-990-t/
(Feb. 13, 2020) [https://perma.cc/M8J4-VSWW].
362. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).
363. Regan v. Tax’n With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 552–53 (1983)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (arguing that the restrictions on lobbying and election activity passed constitutional muster because the IRS administered the law to allow
people involved with the operation to form social welfare organizations and PACs to
speak).
364. See Examining the Landscape, supra note 9, at 376.
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In the end, these organizations could carry out their activity as either taxable or nontaxable as a section 527 political organization. If
these organizations were pushed into section 527, we would preserve
public disclosure of their activities.
E. Health Service and Insurance
What about health service and insurance? Here I focus on the Delta
Dental example. We could likely improve social welfare by providing
more dental insurance for Americans, particularly poor children and
the elderly. According to some statistics, approximately 77% of
Americans had dental health insurance in 2016.365 Those without dental insurance tend to receive less dental care and in turn have more
health issues like heart disease, osteoporosis, and diabetes.366
Nevertheless, a political justice analysis would find tax exemption as
designed problematic. The vague social welfare standard provides little clarity on what is permitted. Tax exemption for social welfare organizations provides a subsidy to individuals to seek collective services
outside of a collective decision-making process. That dental insurance
companies exist within this vague idea is no more than random, but
they do, and only the individuals who control the group—likely the
managers of the company—get a vote on how the services will be provided. This violates PVE. It allows groups that have the capacity to
organize to receive a subsidy from the government with little in the
way of democratically directed limits. Thus, a political-justice analysis
does not generally support tax exemption as currently structured for
the provision of most health care services.
A contract-failure analysis does not support exemption either.
Delta Dental, discussed above in Part III.B, appears to face no challenges selling dental insurance. It is also unlikely to face challenges
generating the funds it needs to operate its business through borrowing or customer generation. It is carrying out an activity that is broadly
carried out in a taxable for-profit manner to a public who pays the
price associated with the activity. Though there appears to be a real
crisis of lack of access to dental care, the social welfare organization
tax rules are not designed to solve this problem. Though Delta Dental
may happen to relieve those issues in some part, it is not because of
the tax law.
A government-failure analysis is not particularly enlightening.
Though there is a dearth of dental services for the poor and the eld365. NAT’L ASS’N OF DENTAL PLANS, Who Has Dental Benefits Today?, https://
www.nadp.org/Dental_Benefits_Basics/Dental_bb_1.aspx#_ftnref1 [https://perma.cc/
X3U2-3DR9].
366. Meera Jagannathan, Why 37 Million People in the U.S. Don’t have Dental Coverage — and the Painful Price They Pay, MARKET WATCH (July 27, 2019, 4:40 PM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/dental-visits-start-declining-around-age-80-andthere-may-be-a-painful-price-to-pay-2019-07-25 [https://perma.cc/8HAS-KXJV].
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erly, the social welfare rules again are not designed to ensure these
needs are met. Also, it is odd to think of dental insurance as some
minority voter desired service as Weisbrod proposed in his theory because dental insurance would seem to be desired by all.
Where does this leave us? Arguably, the subsidy of tax exemption
has been provided through Congress and thus through a democratic
process. How could we find this to violate PVE? There is a crisis of a
lack of access to dental care. The problem is that the use of the subsidy by dental insurance providers was not democratically chosen.
They arbitrarily fit into the vague standard Congress established. Congress could largely correct this by enacting rules on dental care that
ensure dental insurance social welfare organizations meet real collective interest needs rather than just letting the IRS sort things out.
To summarize, to provide exemption in the case of healthcare is to
support a transactional pluralism. By transactional pluralism, I mean
governance intended to honor and support groups making and carrying out collective decisions to benefit democracy that allows the market to make collective decisions on the public’s behalf. We likely think
of these market-based systems as akin to a voting mechanism where
the “market decides” through democratic votes. But these systems are
far from voting systems, and instead, reward individuals with government aid based on their money and success in the market rather than
operating to honor PVE.
F. Community Clubs/Homeowners’ Associations
In this Section, I consider community clubs and homeowners’ associations. I discuss each of these organizations in Part III.B.
What does political justice have to say about these organizations?
Does their tax status help or harm PVE or civil rights? Given that
none of these organizations are likely playing a significant role in advocacy at the broad governmental level, there is no strong reason to
believe they might use the subsidy to drown out other interests at the
governmental level like advocacy organizations. However, it is possible that these organizations are operating at a local level in ways that
are harmful to the democratic nature of the larger municipality. For
instance, homeowners’ associations may be providing security primarily to the immediate neighborhood in a way that is not available and
causes a misallocation of community resources as compared to other
areas. Community service clubs may provide a place for businessmen
and women to have extra access to influence local politics.
At the same time, they likely serve important democratic functions.367 Community clubs and homeowners’ associations both assist
367. See DIMINISHED DEMOCRACY, supra note 291, at 23–24 (making the case that
the loss of community-based clubs around the United States has been harmful to our
democratic enterprise).
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in generating and disseminating information across the community on
broad important topics. As noted in Part III.A, the IRS requires
homeowners’ associations to be broadly open to the public and not
provide individual services.368 Assuming community clubs and homeowners’ associations are genuinely open to the broader community
and not substantially providing services to individual members, there
is little likelihood that these associations will harm popular will and
may even enhance deliberative democratic procedures. As long as
these clubs and associations stay relatively small on a revenue and
assets basis, as it appears from a look at Form 990s described above in
Part III.B, maintaining tax exemption is probably inoffensive. They
likely further values of each of liberal, republican, and deliberativedemocratic traditions by facilitating important civil society dialogue at
a local level.
What about contract and government failure? Both service clubs
and homeowners’ associations likely face real contract failure. It is difficult to organize large groups of neighbors into associations that benefit a broad segment of land.369 Similarly, it is difficult to maintain
community clubs focused on service rather than primarily about social
mingling, as social clubs work.370 They are also both likely to face
challenges in raising necessary funds for their operations. In a government failure sense, large homeowners’ associations that provide
streets, parking, parks and other community attributes fit into the idea
of allowing smaller groups of individuals to come up with a broadbased governmental solution to a community problem. And maybe
these clubs are collective activities that are sought by some but there
is not enough interest for government to provide for them. Thus, contract failure and government failure likely support these types of activities. Maybe that analysis could extend out to other community
clubs like kids’ sports groups.
The lack of the larger community to have the right to vote on activities of a homeowners’ association may raise some issues of political
justice. A community club that is not broadly open to all may also
raise concerns. However, given the low levels of dollars with respect
to both community clubs and homeowners’ associations and the other
values that they bring in both an efficiency sense and a democratic
sense, these may be small concerns. This suggests though that the IRS
ought to require the organizations to be broadly open to the public. It
may be wise to limit the size in revenue and assets of these groups.
Once they get too large, they may no longer be serving the same type
of purpose that they serve as smaller units.
368. See supra Part II.A.
369. See supra Part III.B.
370. See DIMINISHED DEMOCRACY, supra note 291, at 23 (documenting the ways in
which these types of clubs have slowly disappeared in American life).
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G. IRS as the Arbiter of Legitimate Public Activity Harms Us and
the IRS
As discussed in Part II.B, one of the principles of a well-functioning
democracy and of social justice is that justice be publicly seen. People
must be seen to be equally treated, and the government must be operated in a transparent matter.371 Placing a collective choice into the
hands of IRS agents with a vague standard violates that principle. It
takes away the equal treatment of each citizen by removing them from
participating in a collective choice. Additionally, the IRS’s choice
made individually by approving applications is not a transparent one.
Because of the protection of taxpayer privacy,372 much that goes into
the IRS decision is kept from public view. Thus, by making the IRS
the arbiter of the standard by which an organization furthers “social
welfare,” Congress harms both equal treatment and transparency.
The Tea Party Crisis highlights this difficulty.373 Whether true or
not, many in the public broadly believed that the IRS was engaged in
biased treatment of collective political activity. Placing the IRS in that
position harmed us all.374 Problematically, because the IRS cannot be
fully transparent about who qualifies, the IRS can never appear to
publicly do justice. Furthermore, in forcing the IRS to make these
calls of whether citizen collective activity promotes “social welfare,”
Congress pollutes the appearance of justice of the IRS being seen to
fairly and impartially collect revenue.
Congress could partially correct these problems by drawing sharper
rules. It could define the rules of each different type of social welfare
organization. Because the IRS would likely still be seen to take a collective decision away from the public, the arrangement would remain
problematic. Still, the greater clarity in rules would create a much
greater sense of political justice.
This is not an argument that administrative bureaucrats and experts
cannot engage in rulemaking—they can and should. However, the nature of this particular call is so related to our sense of political justice
that the IRS involvement in this matter puts the IRS in a bad position.
It might be possible for this arrangement to work for an agency whose
purpose was solely this matter of determining the goodness of the activity of nonprofits.375 However, because the IRS has a primary pur371. See supra Part I.B.
372. 26 U.S.C. §§ 6103, 6104(c).
373. See supra Part II.A.
374. See supra Part II.A.
375. There are a number of scholars who have called for a new organization to
oversee the nonprofit sector. See Marcus S. Owens, Charity Oversight: An Alternative
Approach, HAUSER CTR. FOR NONPROFIT ORGS., Working Paper 33.3, 11 (2006),
https://cpl.hks.harvard.edu/files/cpl/files/workingpaper_33.4.pdf [https://perma.cc/
VSW5-L9UJ]; Terri Lynn Helge, Policing the Good Guys: Regulation of the Charitable Sector Through a Federal Charity Oversight Board, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 1, 70 (2009); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, “The Better Part of Valour Is Discretion”:
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pose of collecting revenue, which requires the agency to be perceived
as just in fact, the entanglement of the IRS in this fraught matter
makes this social welfare organization determination function
harmful.
H. Assuming Social Welfare Organizations Maintain Exemption,
What Ought We to Do, Keeping Political Justice in Mind?
It is unlikely Congress will end exemption for social welfare organizations. Assuming so, there are a number of changes that could be
made to the tax legal regime to improve political justice.
First, as noted above, Congress could enact detailed rules on social
welfare organizations. This would give greater legitimacy to the actions of the IRS. It is absurd to make the IRS decide whether health
insurance operations ought to receive tax exemption. Congress provides significant requirements for insurers under the Affordable Care
Act (“ACA”), so it could do the same for other health insurance operations. It could also decide to eliminate the HMO from this sphere
altogether.
Additionally, taking a cue from deliberative democracy, Congress
could include rules to make social welfare organizations emblems of a
civil society that create a healthy and effective public sphere. Under a
political justice conception, an organization like the ACLU, by forcefully protecting liberal rights, fulfills that role. The key is these organizations should either exemplify equality of citizens or protect liberal
civil rights. This would mean that rules should be designed to enhance
the deliberative and inclusive nature of social welfare organizations.
Homeowners’ associations could be required to operate democratically and with some level of responsiveness to the larger community in
which they sit. As to advocacy organizations, perhaps there could be
an emphasis on truly educating Congress. Each organization might
have to always consider, and present in genuine fashion, other approaches to an issue.376 They could be a genuine devil’s advocate to
their own proposals.
The difficulty with such an effort is there is no simple language here
to make such rules, and it is surely impractical. Such rules might also
prove harmful to minority interests by forcing such organizations to
engage and include majority interests that despise their particular way
Should the IRS Change or Surrender Its Oversight of Tax-Exempt Organizations?, 7
COLUM. J. TAX L. 80, 113–15 (2016).
376. This has the potential to be offensive and misused if organizations are forced
to describe matters that they firmly do not believe. Imagine a gay rights organization
being forced to discuss the potential merits of gay conversion therapy. Also, this is
arguably the “full and fair exposition test” of the IRS to define ‘educational’ as to
charitable organizations. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3) (2017). The D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals found that test unconstitutional because it was too vague for a person to understand before acting. Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030,
1039 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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of life. It harkens back to the failed IRS full and fair exposition test
for determining whether an organization was educational.377 These
types of challenges make me think it better to end exemption for social welfare organizations instead.
Finally, given the greater selfish nature of social welfare organizations than charitable ones, Congress ought to change a few tax matters. Social welfare organizations should have to pay an investment
income tax. Most scholars today make this claim and it is the right
thing to do for PVE.378 Additionally, and in the same vein, Congress
should also require a taxpayer to recognize gain on appreciated assets
transferred to a social welfare organization.379 These two actions
would go a long way to equalizing any issues associated with nonprofits. Finally, a gift to a social welfare organization should be subject to
the gift tax as well.
I. Application to Charitable Organizations
While this analysis does not explicitly apply to charitable organizations, it suggests that there might be some significant problems with
providing tax exemption to charitable organizations. Those organizations that provide political advocacy within this sector likely ought to
be suspect from a political justice standpoint. A big dividing line,
though, is the fact that there is a much larger body of law defining
what these collective goods provided by the charitable sector are, and
a sense that we have collectively agreed on a fairly large part of what
is contained within exemption for charitable organizations. Nevertheless, the collective action challenges for some combined with the ease
of access for others may likewise call into question the political justice
of exempting charitable organizations from the income tax.
Hospitals make up half of the revenue of the charitable sector.380
Maybe these organizations ought not qualify as currently structured.
Like health insurance in section 501(c)(4), the standard from Congress is quite vague. While Congress made the rules regarding nonprofit hospitals modestly more rigorous in the ACA,381 the
requirements for meeting the charitable standard of a hospital are still
quite modest.382 One of the new provisions is that hospitals must an377. Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 494 F. Supp. 473, 481 (D.D.C. 1979).
378. See Part IV.
379. Congress could extend 26 U.S.C. § 84 to apply to contributions to social welfare organizations (it currently makes the contribution of appreciated assets to a political organization a realization event). Roger Colinvaux, Political Activity Limits and
Tax Exemption: A Gordian’s Knot, 34 VA. TAX REV. 1, 21 (2014).
380. Nat’l Ctr. for Charitable Statistics, The Nonprofit Sector in Brief 2019, URB.
INST. (June 4, 2020), https://nccs.urban.org/publication/nonprofit-sector-brief2019#the-nonprofit-sector-in-brief-2019 [https://perma.cc/4CAM-2X2L].
381. 26 U.S.C. § 501(r).
382. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117 remains the standard for determining
whether a hospital is exempt.
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nually produce a community health needs assessment that evaluates
the health needs of the community.383 However, there is no accountability mechanism for ensuring the hospital is actually meeting those
health needs. Educational charitable organizations from universities
to charter schools are also likely fertile territory for examining the
wisdom of exemption.
VI. CONCLUSION
I have applied a political justice analysis to social welfare organizations. This is only a small part of the Code, and it is only a small part
of tax-exempt organizations. Where else might this analysis have
power? The next natural place to bring the analysis is charitable organizations. I do not make any conclusions here, but I think it suggests
that the charitable sector maybe ought to be significantly revised.
Though a political justice analysis does not provide all the tools to
answer questions of the rationale for tax exemption, it enhances the
analysis. It suggests that much of the field of social welfare organizations, including advocacy organizations and health insurance organizations, would be best as taxable entities rather than tax exempt.
However, it seems to provide some support for smaller, truly community-based, open organizations. And, it may justify exemption in the
case of a true civil liberty-defending organization such as the ACLU.
Nevertheless, politically, this is likely a difficult line to hold. Reducing
the number of organizations that fit into this category and making
them taxable would likely improve the function of the IRS and its
perception as a fair organization by removing from its jurisdiction the
necessity to make toxic political calls.
Additionally, this political justice analysis has potential power to
help build a more just income tax regime. It certainly has impact at
the level of the tax base and the progressive nature of the rate. But
additionally, it is likely there are a number of other Code-level choices
where political justice might clearly play a role. We maintain a number
of incentives in the Code aimed at community redevelopment like
New Market tax credits and opportunity zones. In future articles, I
plan to look deeper both within the tax-exempt sector and without. I
do not examine these other Code sections here, but I believe this analysis of social welfare organizations suggests that a political justice critique can and should be applied to the entirety of the Code.
383. 26 U.S.C. § 501(r)(3); CONG. RSCH. SERV., 501(C)(3) HOSPITALS AND THE
COMMUNITY BENEFIT STANDARD 3 (May 12, 2010), https://crsreports.congress.gov/
product/pdf/RL/RL34605/9 [https://perma.cc/NB94-5R4M].
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